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Abstract
We introduce a generalization of team semantics which provides a
framework for manipulationist theories of causation based on structural
equation models, such as Woodward’s and Pearl’s; our causal teams incor-
porate (partial or total) information about functional dependencies that
are invariant under interventions. We give a unified treatment of obser-
vational and causal aspects of causal models by isolating two operators
on causal teams which correspond, respectively, to conditioning and to
interventionist counterfactual implication.
The evaluation of counterfactuals may involve the production of par-
tially determined teams. We suggest a way of dealing with such cases by
1) the introduction of formal entries in causal teams, and 2) the introduc-
tion of weaker truth values (falsifiability and admissibility), for which we
suggest some plausible semantical clauses.
We introduce formal languages for both deterministic and probabilistic
causal discourse, and study in some detail their inferential aspects. Fi-
nally, we apply our framework to the analysis of direct and total causation,
and other notions of dependence and invariance.
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1 Introduction
Notions of dependence and independence entered the realm of logical investiga-
tion in the early days of mathematical logic, essentially with the introduction, by
Frege, of nested quantification; this aspect of quantification was made explicit by
the notion of Skolem function ([25]). It is only in the last decades, however, that
a systematical analysis of (in)dependence notions within predicative, proposi-
tional, modal logical languages has been undertaken. One of the main unifying
tools in this enterprise is the so-called team semantics ([14],[15],[31]), whose key
idea is that formulas involving dependencies acquire meaning only when eval-
uated over sets of assignments. Variations of this methodology have allowed
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a systematical study of logical systems enriched with dependencies that arise
from database theory, probabilistic theory and quantum information theory. In
many cases, distinct notions of (in)dependence can coexist in one and the same
formal language, and this kind of interplay has been systematically investigated
from the point of view of definability and complexity. However, to the best of
our knowledge, the framework of team semantics has not yet been used to inves-
tigate notions of causal and counterfactual dependence. In the present paper,
we provide a generalization of team semantics that is also adequate to capture
causal, counterfactual and probabilistic notions of (in)dependence which arise
from modern manipulationist theories of causation such as Pearl’s ([22]) and
Woodward’s ([38]). The generalization is not trivial. It is usually acknowledged
in the literature that causal relationships cannot be reduced to mere correlations
of data (the latter can be represented by a set of assignments.) Instead, a richer
structure, encoding counterfactual assumptions, is needed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we give a short motivation
for the manipulationist (interventionist) approach to causation. In section 3 we
present team semantics and show how to adequately enrich it so that it can
handle interventionist counterfactuals. We will introduce several languages to
express various (deterministic) notions of dependence. In section 4 we analyze
the logical properties of these languages, up to some basic soundness and com-
pleteness proofs; we use some of these properties to compare our counterfactuals
with those of Stalnaker ([27]), Lewis ([18]) and Galles&Pearl ([8]). Section 5 is
dedicated to the logical issues that arise from nonparametric models. In section
6 we introduce probabilistic causal languages. In section 7 we will discuss vari-
ous notions of causation (mainly taken from Woodward) and invariance, in the
light of the logic developed in earlier sections.
2 Theories of causation: background
The reductive approach to causation has been philosophers’ favourite tool. It
aims, roughly, at finding necessary and sufficient conditions for causal relation-
ships like “X causes Y ”. Two such conditions have been prominent in the lit-
erature: those formulated in terms of conditional probabilities, and those based
on counterfactuals (counterfactual dependence). We discuss them shortly in the
next two sections. The main purpose of presenting them is to understand some
of the reasons why the reductive approach has been found unsatisfactory and
replaced by non-reductive approaches, such as the manipulationist or interven-
tionist accounts of counterfactuals and causation (Pearl, Woodward, Halpern,
Hitchcock, Briggs, among others).
2.1 Conditional probabilities
Two well known endeavours to connect causal relationships with conditional
probabilities are due to P. Suppes ([29]) and N. Cartwright ([4]). For instance,
Cartwright ([4], p. 26) requires that causes raise the probabilities of their effect:
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(CC) C causes E iff Pr(E/C,Kj) > Pr(E/Kj) for all state descriptions Kj
which satisfy certain conditions.
Woodward ([37]) finds (CC) defective in two ways. Firstly, the requirement
to conditionalize on all Kj is too strong, and a weaker, existential condition
would suffice. Secondly, (CC) holds, as initially intended, only for positive
causes. When negative (inhibiting) changes are taken into account, it is natural
to replace Pr(E/C,Kj) > Pr(E/Kj) by Pr(E/C,Kj) 6= Pr(E/Kj) which only
requires C and E to be (probabilistically) dependent. With these two points in
mind, Woodward ([37]) proposes to replace (CC) with something of the following
sort:
(*) X causes Z if and only if X and Z are dependent conditional on certain
other factors F .
where X and Z are variables standing for properties.
The problem now becomes that of specifying the other factors F . Cartwright
suggests that they include other causes of Z with the exception of those which
are on a causal chain from X to Z. She recognizes, however ([4], p. 30; [5],
p. 95 ff; [37], p. 58) that the claim that we should never condition on all
such intermediate variables is too strong. Woodward ([37]) makes it clear that
in order to understand these restrictions, and more broadly, in order for the
project of specifying the other factors F to have any hope of success, we need to
refer to other causes of Y and the way they are connected. For instance, to see
why it is inappropriate to conditionalize on the variables which lie on a causal
chain from X to Z, as Cartwright first suggestion goes, it is enough to consider
the causal structure
X → Y → Z
Now if we were to conditionalize on Y , we would expect, intuitively, X and Z
to be independent, which according to the definition above would result in X
not being a cause of Z. But this is not what we want.
On the other side, to see that the requirement of never conditionalizing on
the variables on causal chains from X to Z is too strong, it is enough to consider
the causal structure in which both X and Y are “direct” causes of Z and are
Y
X Z
on the causal paths between X and Z. If the causal connection between X and
Z is to be reflected in the probabilistic dependence of Z on X conditional on
some other properties F , then these other properties must include Y . In other
words, to determine the causal influence of X on Z we must take into account
the influence of Y on Z.
What all this shows, according to Woodward, is that the project to connect
causal relationships betweenX and Y with conditional probabilities, which finds
4
its expression in (*), goes via a mechanism which provides information about
other causes (contributing or or total) of y besides X and how these causes are
connected with one another and with Z. ([37], p. 58.)
One such mechanism is that of causal Bayesian networks (Pearl 2000/2009
[22], Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993/2001 [26]). They are built on Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) of the kind we have already encountered in our earlier
examples. We start with a set of variables V = {X1, ....Xn} whose causal rela-
tionships we want to investigate and a set of (directed) edges. A directed edge
from the variableX (parent) to the variable Z (child) is intended to represent the
fact that X is a direct cause of Z. The set of all parents of Z is denoted as PAZ .
The project is now to investigate the connection between causal relationships
generated by the edges of the graph and conditional probabilities P (Z/PAZ)
determined by a joint probability distribution P over V . More exactly, let P
be a joint probability distribution on the set V . We denote by x1, x2, ..., xn the
values associated with the variables in V , that is, X1 = x1, ..., Xn = xn. A DAG
G is said to represent P if the equation
P (x1, ..., xn) =
∏
i
P (xi/pai) (1)
holds, where the variables PAi obey the parent-child relation of G: Y ∈ PAi if
and only if there is an arrow in G from Y to Xi.
A well known result states the following:
Theorem 2.1 (Markov Condition, [34]). Let G be a DAG with V its set of
variables. G represents a probability distribution P if and only if every variable
in V is independent of all its nondescendants (in G) conditional on its parents.
A DAG G which represents a probability distribution P is often referred as
causal Bayesian network. The Markov Condition is thought to be important
because it establishes a connection between causal relationships as represented
by the arrows of a DAG and dependence relationships. For instance, if we
take “Z is a nondescendant of X” to stand for “X does not cause Z”, then
the Markov condition implies that if “X does not cause Z” then conditional
on its parents, X is independent of Z , which by contraposition gives us the
right-to-left direction of (*):
• If variables X and Z are dependent (that is: Pr(X/Parents(X), Z) 6=
Pr(X/Parents(X))), then X causes Z.
(Cf. e.g. [37])
As handy as causal Bayesian networks are to connect causes with condi-
tional probabilities, they fail to represent caunterfactual reasoning ([22], p. 37).
In other words, if we want a robust notion of cause which sustains counter-
factuals, we need to supplement causal Bayesian networks with an additional,
deterministic component.
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2.2 Counterfactual dependence
Accounts of causal relationships based on counterfactual dependence have been
available starting with the works of David Lewis and G. H. von Wright. Lewis
([17], [19]) reduces causal relationships to counterfactual dependence, which, in
the end, is defined in terms of similarity between possible worlds. Von Wright
([35]) distinguishes a causal connection between p and q from an accidental
generalization (the concomitance of p and q) on the basis of the fact that the
former, unlike the latter, sustains a counterfactual assumption of the form ”on
occasions where p, in fact, was not the case, q would have accompanied it, had p
been the case”; that is, p is a state of affairs which we can produce or suppress at
will. It is thus the manipulativity of the antecedent which is the individuating
aspect of the cause factor ([35], p. 70). Lewis’s account has been criticized for
relying too much on “dubious metaphysics” and von Wright’s account for being
too “anthropomorphic”.
Both Lewis’s and von Wright’s accounts contain ingredients which have been
incorporated later on into interventionist accounts of counterfactuals and cau-
sation. Roughly, one needs a mechanism to represent the exogenous process
which is the manipulation of the (variables of the) antecedent of a counterfac-
tual. This mechanism has become known as intervention1. In addition, we
need another mechanism to measure the effects the changes of the intervened
variables have on the (variables of the) consequent. This mechanism is encoded
into the so-called structural (functional) equations ([22], [37]).
In more details, we divide the set of variables whose causal relationships
we want to investigate into two disjoint sets: a set V of endogenous variables
and a set U of exogenous variables. With each endogenous variable X ∈ V, an
equation of the form
X = fX(PAX)
is associated, where the variables PAX ⊆ U ∪ V \ {X} are called the parents
of X . The standard interpretation of a functional equation X = fX(PAX) is
that of a law which specifies the value of X given every possible combination
of the values of PAX . If we draw an arrow from each variable in PAX to the
variableX we obtain directed graphs as in the case of the causal Bayesian frame-
works mentioned in the previous section. The crucial difference between the two
frameworks is that in the present case, instead of characterizing the child-parent
relationships stochastically in terms of conditional probabilities P (X/PAX), we
characterize them deterministically using the equations.
Various notions of intervention have been proposed, both in the context of
causal Bayesian networks and in that of structural equations (e.g., [26], [36],
[12], and [22]). A detailed discussion of this variety is outside the scope of this
paper. Suffice it to say that an intervention do(X = x) on a variable X is
an action which disconnects the variable X from all the incoming arrows into
X while preserving all the other arrows of the graph including those directed
1Lewis does not speak of interventions, but their role is mirrored, in the work of Lewis, by
the notions of “local miracle” and “non-backtracking counterfactual”.
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out of X . This is known as the arrow-breaking conception of interventions.
In the structural equations framework where the causal graph is induced by
the appropriate set of equations, the intervention do(X = x) results also in
the alteration of that set: the equation X = fX(PAX) associated with the
variable X is replaced with a new equation X = x, while keeping intact the
other equations in the set.
It may be useful to illustrate these notions by way of an example ([37]).
Consider the following two equations:
(6) Y = aX (7) Z = bX + cY
This set of equations induces the DAG
Y
X Z
If we intervene on Y and set its value to 1 (i.e., do(Y = 1)), the result will
be the altered system of equations:
(6′) Y = 1 (7) Z = bX + cY
corresponding to the new DAG:
Y
X Z
2.3 Various notions of cause
Woodward ([36],[37]) uses interventions in the context of structural equations to
define “X is a cause of Y ”. It turns out, however, that there are several distinct
notions of cause, each satisfying the central commitment of the manipulability
theory of causation: there is a causal relationship between X and Y whenever
there is a possible intervention that changes the value of X such that carrying
it out changes the value of Y (or its probability). [37], p. 54). Here are several
notions of cause:
(DC) (Direct cause) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct
cause of Y with respect to some variable set Z is that there be a possible
intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution of
Y ) when all the other variables in Z besides X and Y are held fixed at
some values by interventions. ([37], p. 52)
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For Woodward, direct causes correspond to the parent-child relationships in the
underlying DAG. The other notions cannot be always recovered from the arrows
of the DAG:
(TC) (Total cause) X is a total cause of Y if and only if it has a non-null total
effect on Y - that is, if and only if there is some intervention on X alone
such that for some values of the other variables, this intervention on X
will change Y . The total effect of a change dx in X on Y is the change
in the value of Y that would result from an intervention on X alone that
changes it by amount dx (given the values of other variables that are not
descendants of X). ([37], p. 54)
(CC) (Contributing cause) X is a contributing cause of Y if and only if it
makes non-null contribution to Y along some directed path in the sense
that there is some set of values of variables that are not on this path such
that if these variables were fixed at those values, there is some intervention
on X that will change the value of Y . The contribution to a change in
the value of Y due to a change dx in the value of X along some directed
path is the change in the value of Y that would result from this change
in X , given that the values of off path variables are fixed by independent
interventions. ([37], pp. 54-55)
For instance in our earlier example consisting of the set of equations (6) and
(7), X is a direct cause of Z. To make this more transparent we shall assume
that the coefficients a, b, c are all equal to 1.
We first intervene on Y and set its value to 1 as we did above (i.e., do(Y =
1)). The result will be the altered system of equations:
(6′) Y = 1 (7) Z = X + Y.
Next we perform two (independent) interventions on the system (6’)-(7): do(X =
1) yields Z = 2; and do(X = 2) yields Z = 3. We conclude that X is a direct
cause of Z in the sense of (DC).
Consider now the set of equations
(8) Y = aX (9) Z = dY
which corresponds to the DAG
X −→ Y −→ Z
Any intervention do(Y = e) leads to the system of equations
(8′) Y = e (9) Z = dY
Now it is obvious that no change in the value of X will have any influence on
the value of Z, hence X is not a direct cause of Z as expected. On the other
side, it is easy to see that X is a total cause of Z in the sense of (TC) – except
in the special case that d = 1a .
In section 7 we shall represent some of these causal notions in the framework
of causal team semantics, to which we now turn.
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3 Causal team semantics
3.1 Teams
Team semantics was introduced by W. Hodges ([14],[15]) in order to provide
a compositional presentation of the (game-theoretically defined) semantics of
Independence-Friendly logic ([13],[20]). In the following years, team seman-
tics has been used to extend first-order logic with database dependencies (e.g.
Dependence logic [31], Independence logic [10], Inclusion logic [9]); similar ap-
proaches have been applied to propositional logics ([40],[41]) and modal logics
([32], [30], [1]). Appropriate generalizations of teams have been used as de-
scriptive languages for probabilistic dependencies ([7]), for quantum phenomena
([16]), for Bayes networks ([6]).
The basic idea of team semantics is that notions such as dependence and
independence, which express properties of relations (instead of individuals),
cannot be captured by Tarskian semantics, which evaluates formulas on sin-
gle assignments2; the appropriate unit for semantical evaluation is instead the
team, i.e., a set of assignments (all sharing a common variable domain). In the
standard approach, all the values of the variables come from a unique domain
of individuals associated with an underlying model. However, in order to model
causal and counterfactual dependence, we shall need to relax the assumption
that variables may take as values only individuals coming from a common do-
main. Instead we shall take variables to represent properties which may have all
kinds of values (as specified by their range). That is, once a set Dom of variables
is fixed, each assignment will be a mapping s : Dom→
⋃
X∈DomRan(X) such
that s(X) ∈ Ran(X) for each X ∈ Dom. A team T of domain dom(T ) = Dom
will be any set of such assignments.
As an example, recall Woodward’s DAG corresponding to the structural
equations (6) and (7) (subsection 2.2). We may take X to express the property
“(whether it is) winter”, Y the property “(whether it is) cloudy” and Z the
property “(whether it is) snowing” and take them to be represented in the team
T = {s1, s2}:
X Y Z
s1 0 0 0
s2 1 1 1
The basic semantic relation is now T |= ψ: the team T satisfies the formula
ψ.
One can define a team semantics already for classical propositional lan-
guages. However such a semantics does not really add anything new, in the
sense that
T |= ψ if and only if for all s ∈ T , s |= ψ (in the Tarskian sense).
That is, the meaning of a first-order formula is always reducible to a prop-
erty of single assignments. However, once their semantics is expressed in terms
2This can be formally proved, see [3].
9
of teams, propositional languages can be extended in ways that would be un-
available within Tarskian semantics; for instance, one can add (functional) de-
pendence atoms =(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ) whose semantics is defined by
(*) T |==(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ) if and only if for all s, s′ ∈ X , if s(X1) = s′(X1), . . . ,
s(Xn) = s
′(Xn), then s(Y ) = s
′(Y )
expressing that Y is functionally determined by {X1, . . . , Xn}; and this is a
global property of the team, not reducible to properties of the single assign-
ments3.
Thus, in our example, it holds that whether it is snowing depends completely
on whether it is winter, T |== (X ;Z), and whether it is cloudy, T |==(Y ;Z);
and whether it is cloudy depends entirely on whether it is winter, T |==(X ;Y ).
A team therefore might be used, for example, to represent a set of individual
records coming from a statistical or experimental investigation; or, to represent
all possible configurations that are compatible with the ranges of each variable;
or yet, a subset of all possible configurations. This last case is particularly
important in our context: it may well happen that some configurations are for-
bidden, even though they respect all variable ranges; this in particular happens
if there are functional dependencies between the variables. For what regards
the first possibility (analysis of statistical data) for many purposes it may be
more suitable to use multiteams, which allow multiple copies of assignments.
Team-theoretical logical languages could thus be used to express global prop-
erties of distributions of values. On a second, different interpretation, teams
and multiteams may be used to represent epistemic uncertainty about the cur-
rent state of affairs; if one thinks of each assignment as a possible world, then
the team may be thought as representing a set of equally plausible worlds. An
intervention on such an object should, therefore, produce a new set of equally
plausible candidates for the actual world.
3.2 Causal teams
Despite some claims to the contrary in the literature, teams are insufficient
to represent counterfactuals and causal notions based on them. As explained
in subsection 2.2, a proper treatment of causal notions requires an account of
counterfactual information, as encoded e.g. in invariant structural equations.
It is true that a team sustains a number of functional dependencies among
variables; but such dependencies may well be contingent, and disappear if the
system is intervened upon. For this reason, we must extend teams so that they
incorporate invariant dependencies or functions; and we must explain what may
count as an intervention on a team.
Besides the ideal case in which a causal model contains a complete descrip-
tion of the functions involved in the structural equations (parametric case), we
develop our semantics with enough generality as to accomodate the more re-
alistic case in which we possess only partial information about the functions
3Actually, it is a property of pairs of assignments of X, but more complex formulas arise
whose meaning cannot be analogously reduced.
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(nonparametric case); as an extreme case, the model might only incorporate
information as to which functional dependencies are invariant. In the nonpara-
metric case, not all counterfactual statements can be evaluated; the additional
logical complications related to this case will be examined in section 5. Most of
the paper will focus on the parametric case.
Before proceeding, we want to fix some notational conventions. As is often
done in the literature on causal models, we use the symbol PAY ambiguously, so
that it may mean either the set of parents of Y , or a sequence of the same vari-
ables in some fixed alphabetical ordering. For other sets/sequences of variables,
we will adhere to the following conventions:
Notation 3.1. • We use boldface letters such as X to denote either a set
{X1, . . . , Xn} of variables or a sequence of the same variables (in the fixed
alphabetical order)
• We use x to denote a set or sequence of values, each of which is a value
for exactly one of the variables in X. We leave the details of these corre-
spondences between variables and values as non-formalized.
• Writing s(X) we mean the set/sequence of values s(X1), . . . , s(Xn) that
the assignment s assigns to each of the variables in X
• Ran(X) is an abbreviation for
∏
X∈XRan(X)
• By X\Y we denote the set/the sequence (in alphabetical order) of variables
occurring in X but not in Y, and by x \ y a corresponding set/sequence
of values
• By X∩Y we denote the set/sequence of variables occurring in both X and
Y, and by x ∩ y the corresponding set/sequence of values
and so on.
Given a team T− and a variable X ∈ dom(T−), we write T−(X) for the set
of values that are obtained for X in the team T−; that is, T−(X) = {s(X)|s ∈
T−}. As before, we say that a team T− satisfies a functional dependence =
(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ), and we write T
− |==(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ), if:
for all s, s′ ∈ T−, if s(Xi) = s
′(Xi) for all i = 1..n, then s(Y ) = s
′(Y ).
Definition 3.2. A causal team T over variable domain dom(T ) with endoge-
nous variables V ⊆ dom(T ) is a quadruple T = (T−, G(T ),RT ,FT ), where:
1. T− is a team.
2. G(T ) = (dom(T ), E) is a graph over the set of variables. For any X ∈
dom(T ), we denote as PAX the set of all variables Y ∈ dom(T ) such that
the arrow (Y,X) is in E.
3. RT = {(X,Ran(X))|X ∈ dom(T )} (where the Ran(X) may be arbitrary
sets) is a function which assigns a range to each variable
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4. FT is a function {(Vi, fVi)|Vi ∈ V} that assigns to each endogenous vari-
able a |PAVi |-ary function fVi : dom(fVi)→ ran(Vi)
(for some dom(fVi) ⊆ Ran(PAVi))
which satisfies the further restrictions:
a) T−(X) ⊆ Ran(X) for each X ∈ dom(T )
b) If PAY = {X1, . . . , Xn}, then T− |==(X1, . . . , Xn;Y )
c) if s ∈ T− is such that s(PAY ) ∈ dom(fY ), then s(Y ) = fY (s(PAY )).
In case dom(fV ) = Ran(PAV ) for each V ∈ V, we say the causal team is
parametric; otherwise it is nonparametric.
Clause b) is there to ensure that whenever the graph contains an arrow
Xi → Y , and {X1, . . .Xn} is the maximal set of variables whence arrows
come to Y , then the team satisfies the corresponding functional dependency
=(X1, . . . Xn;Y ). Clause c) further ensures that such functional dependency is
in accordance with the (partial description of the) function fY ∈ FT .
The functional component FT induces an associated system of structural
equations, say
Y := FT (Y )(PAY )
for each variable Y ∈ dom(T ).
Example 3.3. Consider a causal team T which has underlying team T− =
{{(U, 2), (X, 1), (Y, 2), (Z, 4)}, {(U, 3), (X, 1), (Y, 2), (Z, 4)}, {(U, 1), (X, 3), (Y, 3),
(Z, 1)}, {(U, 1), (X, 4), (Y, 1), (Z, 1)}, {(U, 4), (X, 4), (Y, 1), (Z, 1)}}, graph G(T ) =
({U,X, Y, Z}, {(U,Z), (X,Y ), (Y, Z), (X,Z)}), ranges Ran(U) = Ran(X) =
Ran(Y ) = Ran(Z) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and partial description of (one value of) the
invariant function for Z: F(Z)(4, 1, 2) := 3. We represent the T− and G(T )
components of T by means of a decorated table:
U X Y Z
2 1 2 4
3 1 2 4
1 3 3 1
1 4 1 1
4 4 1 1
3.3 Explicit causal teams
For many purposes – first of all, to keep a smoother account of the operations of
taking subteams, and of applying iterated interventions – it will be convenient
to restrict attention to causal teams of a special form. This restriction causes
no loss of generality within the developments pursued in the present paper.
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Definition 3.4. A causal team T = (T−, G(T ),RT ,FT ) with endogenous vari-
ables V is explicit if, for every V ∈ V, the following additional condition holds:
d) Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be the list of the parents of V in the fixed alphabetical
order. For every s ∈ T−, (s(X1), . . . , s(Xn)) ∈ dom(fY ).
(Here, as in the definition of causal team, fY is a shorthand for FT (Y )).
In words, the FT component of an explicit causal team encodes all the
information of the team that concerns invariant functions; no further values of
the functions can be reconstructed from the team component T−.
Given any causal team, it is always possible to construct in a canonical way
an explicit causal team that corresponds to it, in the sense that it encodes ex-
actly the same information (but it is more stable under the operations of taking
subteams or interventions – to be defined in the following subsections). For
this purpose, given a causal team T = (T−, G(T ),RT ,FT ) with endogenous
variables V, to any variable Z ∈ V we may associate an explicit function
hTZ : Ran(W )→ Ran(Z) as follows; given paZ ∈ Ran(W ), define
hTZ(paZ) =
{
fZ(paZ) if this is defined in T
s(Z) if there is some row s in T with s(PAZ) = paZ
(Conditions b) and c) in the definition of causal team ensure that hTZ is well-
defined.)
We collect these explicit functions in a single function HT such that, for each
variable Z ∈ V, HT (Z) := hTZ . Then:
The explicit causal team associated to T is TE := (T−, G(T ),RT ,HT ).
3.4 Causal subteams
It will be important, in order to define a semantics for our languages, to talk
about causal subteams. A causal subteam S of a causal team T is meant to
express a condition of lesser uncertainty; this will be encoded by the fact that
the assignments in S− form a subset of the assignments of T−, which may be
interpreted as the fact that less configurations are considered possible. At the
same time, the transition to a subteam should not erase information concerning
the graph, the ranges of variables, and the invariant functions. The defini-
tions in the previous subsection should make it clear that this proviso is easily
guaranteed if T is an explicit causal team. In this case, we can define:
Definition 3.5. Given an explicit causal team T , a causal subteam S of T is
a causal team with the same domain and the same set of endogenous variables,
which satisfies the following conditions:
1. S− ⊆ T−
2. G(S) = G(T )
3. RS = RT
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4. FS = FT .
In case the team T is not explicit, what can go wrong is that, for some
endogenous variable Y , there may be some assignment s ∈ T− \ S− such that
(s(X1), . . . , s(Xn)) /∈ dom(fY ) (where X1, . . . , Xn list PAY in alphabetical or-
der); in such case, the team T encodes the fact that the invariant function which
produces Y assigns, to the list of arguments (s(X1), . . . , s(Xn)), the value s(Y );
but this information is lost in the subteam S. To avoid this problem, we can
define more generally:
Definition 3.6. Given a causal team T , a causal subteam S of T is a causal
subteam of the associated explicit team TE (as defined in subsection 3.3)
This second definition obviously coincides with the previous one over explicit
causal teams.
3.5 A basic language and its semantics
Before discussing interventions and counterfactuals, we need to specify what it
means for a causal team to satisfy atomic formulas and their boolean combina-
tions. The kind of language we consider, for now, contains atomic dependence
statements of the form =(X;Y ); atomic formulas of the forms Y = y and Y 6= y,
where Y ∈ dom(T−) and y ∈ Ran(Y ); connectives ∧ and ∨.
By analogy with the other kinds of team semantics that have been proposed
in the literature, we can define satisfaction of a formula by a causal team by the
clauses:
• T |==(X;Y ) if for all s, s′ ∈ T , s(X) = s′(X) implies s(Y ) = s′(Y ).
• T |= Y = y if, for all s ∈ T−, s(Y ) = y.
• T |= Y 6= y if, for all s ∈ T−, s(Y ) 6= y.
• T |= ψ ∧ χ if T |= ψ and T |= χ.
• T |= ψ∨χ if there are two causal subteams T1, T2 of T such that T
−
1 ∪T
−
2 =
T−, T1 |= ψ and T2 |= χ.4
3.6 Selective implication
Our main goal is to give an exact semantics to counterfactual statements of
the form “If ψ had been the case, then χ would have been the case”. Very
often, however, one find examples in the literature where these statements are
embedded into a larger context. We have seen that von Wright ([35]) considers
examples of the form “on occasions where p, in fact was not the case, q would
have accompanied it, had p been the case”. Pearl ([22]) analyzes the following
4Notice that defining the union of any pair of causal teams of the same domain is prob-
lematic, as the information on invariant functions given by each team might be incompatible
with the information encoded in the other team.
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query: “what is the probability Q that a subject who died under treatment
(X = 1, Y = 1) would have recovered (Y = 0) had he or she not been treated
(X = 0)?
The appropriate representation of the last statement seems to be:
(X = 1 ∧ Y = 1) ⊃ (X = 0✷→ Y = 0).
where the symbol ✷→ stands for counterfactual implication, while the selective
implication ⊃ is a form of restriction of the range of application of the coun-
terfactual to the available evidence. What it does is to generate a subteam by
selecting those assignments which satisfy the antecedent; and then it is checked
whether the consequent holds in this subteam.
Given a causal team T , and a classical formula ψ (that is, a formula as in
subsection 3.5, but without dependence atoms) define the subteam Tψ by the
condition:
• (Tψ)− = {s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ}.
Then, we define selective implication by the clause:
• T |= ψ ⊃ χ iff Tψ |= χ.
Here the consequent χ can be any formula of our current logical language;
therefore, it might happen not to be a property of single assignments. Instead,
we require for now the antecedent to be classical. The general idea is that
selective implication is a reasonable operator only for antecedents which are flat
formulas, in the sense with which this word is used in the literature on logics
of dependence (which will be reviewed in the following subsections). Actually,
typical applications involve at most conjunctions of atomic formulas of the type
Z = z.
Example 3.7. We observe that the selective implication
T |= Z = 3 ⊃ Y = 2
holds on any causal team that is based on the team T which is depicted in the
figure:
Z Y X
1 2 3
2 1 1
3 2 1
3 2 2
To see that the formula holds on it, we have to construct the reduced subteam
TZ=3:
Z Y X
3 2 1
3 2 2
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which is obtained by selecting the third and fourth row of the previous table
(the rows that satisfy Z = 3). We can see, then, that Y = 2 is satisfied by
each row of this smaller table. Therefore, by the semantical clause for this kind
of atomic formulas, TZ=3 |= Y = 2. Then, the semantical clause for selective
implication allows us to conclude that T |= Z = 3 ⊃ Y = 2.
Notice that we only needed the team structure in order to evaluate a selective
implication; all the information required to evaluate it is already encoded in the
team, and no information about the structural equations or the underlying DAG
is needed.
3.7 Interventions on teams: some examples
Our goal is to define (interventionist) counterfactual implication. The task is
more complicated than in the case of selective implication; we first illustrate
the idea with some examples; formal definitions will be provided after that.
Informally, the idea is that a counterfactual X = x✷→ ψ is true in the causal
team T if ψ is true in the causal team which results from an intervention do(X =
x) applied to the team T .
Example 3.8. Consider any causal team T with T− = {{(X, 1), (Y, 2), (Z, 3)},
{(X, 2), (Y, 1), (Z, 4)}, {(X, 4), (Y, 1), (Z, 4)}, {(X, 3), (Y, 3), (Z, 4)}}, and under-
lying graph G(T ) = ({X,Y, Z}, {(X,Y ), (Y, Z)}) (we omit specifying the RT
and FT components). We can represent it as an annotated table:
X Y Z
1 2 3
2 1 4
4 1 4
3 3 4
We want to establish whether the counterfactual Y = 2✷→ Z = 3 holds in T .
The idea is to intervene in T by setting the value of Y to 2 (this corresponds
to replacing the function fy with the constant function 2); updating all other
variables that invariantly depend on Y ; and removing all the arrows that enter
into Y . The causal team thus produced will be denoted by TY=2. So, first we
intervene on Y :
X Y Z
1 2 . . .
2 2 . . .
4 2 . . .
3 2 . . .
Z is the only variable which has an invariant dependence on Y ; therefore, we
have to update its column. Since the function that determines Z has Y as its
only parameter, we just have to consult T and see that, in rows where Y has
value 2, Z takes value 3. Therefore, TY=2 looks like this:
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X Y Z
1 2 3
2 2 3
4 2 3
3 2 3
(Again, we are omitting a representation of the RT and FT components). Now
TY=2 |= Z = 3, therefore we conclude that T |= Y = 2✷→ Z = 3. The team
TY=2 describes a counterfactual situation in which we have certainty about the
values of Y and Z, but not about the value of X.
Notice that this example uses both the team and the graph structure, but
the specific invariant functions are not needed in the evaluation of this specific
sentence. However, the observations above do not cover, for example, evaluation
of counterfactuals of the form Y = 4✷→ . . . , because team and graph structure
do not tell us anything about what value should Z take in circumstances in which
Y = 4.
Example 3.9. We consider a slightly less trivial example. Here we evaluate
the counterfactual Y = 2✷→ (Z = 2 ∨ Z = 3) in the causal team T shown in
the picture below
X Y Z
1 1 1
1 2 2
2 2 3
(The components RT and FT are omitted as before). So we must produce
again TY=2. First we intervene on Y
X Y Z
1 2 . . .
1 2 . . .
2 2 . . .
and next we update the value of Z, taking into account both the values of X
and Y in each row (since Z is reached both by arrows coming from X and from
Y ). Notice that now two of the modified rows become identical, so that only one
appears in the table:
X Y Z
1 2 2
2 2 3
This team can be partitioned into two causal subteams:
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X Y Z
1 2 2
X Y Z
2 2 3
the first of which satisfies Z = 2, while the second satisfies Z = 3. Therefore,
by the semantical clause for disjunction, TY=2 satisfies Z = 2∨Z = 3. We may
conclude that T |= Y = 2✷→ (Z = 2 ∨ Z = 3).
Example 3.10. Here we present an example involving nonparametric teams.
Our goal is to evaluate X = 1✷→ Y = 2 in the nonparametric team T shown
in the picture:
U X Y Z
2 1 2 4
3 1 2 4
1 3 3 1
1 4 1 1
Here we are assuming that dom(FT (Y )) = dom(FT (Z)) = ∅; ranges might
be given, for example, by RT (U) = RT (X) = RT (Y ) = RT (Z) = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
In order to evaluate X = 1✷→ Y = 2 we need to generate the causal team
TX=1. First we intervene on X; this will affect all descendants of X, which in
this case are the (children) Y and Z.
U X Y Z
2 1 . . . . . .
3 1 . . . . . .
1 1 . . . . . .
1 1 . . . . . .
Notice, however, that we cannot yet evaluate Z (which is a function of U,X
and Y ) unless we first update Y :
U X Y Z
2 1 2 . . .
3 1 2 . . .
1 1 2 . . .
Finally we update Z, but we have a surprise:
U X Y Z
2 1 2 4
3 1 2 4
1 1 2 fˆZ(1, 1, 2)
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The information contained in the team T− is insufficient for the evaluation of
the Z-value of the last row of TX=1. Since the triple (1, 1, 2) is not in the domain
of FT (Z), the best we could do is to fill that part of the table with a formal term.
Here we wrote fˆZ as a formal symbol distinguished from the function fZ . In
general, in case of repeated interventions, we can expect also complex terms, with
incapsulated function symbols, to be produced. Notice however that we have no
uncertainties about the Y column; so, it is natural to state that TX=1 |= Y =
2, and that, therefore, T |= X = 1✷→ Y = 2. What if we were instead
trying to evaluate some statement about Z under these same counterfactual
circumstances? We might renounce completely to assign truth values to such
statements; or we might perhaps add a further truth value, which holds of such
statement if the statement is admissible given the form of the terms involved.
A precise semantical definition is not trivial, and we address it later.
Example 3.11. Consider now a causal team S which is identical to that which
was considered in the previous example, except for that its functional component,
instead of being empty, contains at least a partial description of the invariant
function for Z; we assume that FS(Z) = fZ is such that (1, 1, 2) ∈ dom(fZ),
and that fZ(1, 1, 2) = 3. If we now apply the intervention do(X = 1) to this
causal team, we can use this extra information to explicitly evaluate the last
entry of SX=1, obtaining the causal team
ST=1:
U X Y Z
2 1 2 4
3 1 2 4
1 1 2 3
3.8 Formal definition of interventions and counterfactuals
All the examples in the previous subsection have one aspect in common: the
graphs underlying causal teams are acyclic. In this case the corresponding causal
team is called recursive, by analogy with the literature on structural equation
models; the examples show that, for these kinds of causal teams, the notion of
intervention is naturally conceived in algorithmic terms. We now move towards
a precise definition.
We have learned a number of lessons from the previous examples:
A. An intervention do(X = x) amounts to 1) setting the whole X-column to x;
2) eliminating all arrows that enter into X ; 3) updating the columns that
correspond to descendants of X .
B. It might not be possible to update all the descendants of X in a single step
(actually, the order of updating might not be trivial to decide).
C. The information encoded in the causal team might be insufficient for gener-
ating, under intervention, a proper causal team; we must then admit teams
which assign formal terms to some variables.
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We begin by addressing this last problem. Given a graph G whose set of
vertices V is a set of variables, we call LG the set of function symbols fˆX (of
arity card(PAX)), for each X ∈ V (actually, we only need one symbol for each
endogenous variable, that is, for variables which have indegree at least one).
We call G-terms the terms generated from variables in V and from symbols
in LG by the obvious inductive rules; the set of G-terms will be denoted as
TermG. When speaking of a causal team T , we will implicitly assume, from
now on, that the ranges of all variables contain the set of terms TermG(T ).
Actually, it is not difficult to prove that (iterated) interventions (as defined
below) on a recursive causal team with finite variable ranges can generate only
a finite number of formal terms. Therefore, in principle a finite causal team
could always be extended to a finite causal team with formal terms, by using
an appropriate finite subset of TermG(T ) to extend the ranges of variables.
We may combine these ideas with those of subsection 3.3. Given a causal
team T , let T ′ be the causal team obtained by extending the ranges of variables
with formal terms, as described above. Form then the corresponding explicit
team TFE := (T ′)E following the construction given in subsection 3.3. We
call TFE the fully explicit causal team corresponding to T . The invariant
functions of TFE now encode sufficient information for performing any kind of
intervention that we will consider in this paper. The fact that the ranges of
variables contain formal terms solves issue C. The fact that the team is explicit
ensures that no information is lost after an intervention.
Now we address problem B. How do we decide the order of updating for the
columns? To understand the problem, observe the graph in the figure:
X Y
Z
Y is connected to X by an arrow, so one might think that, in an intervention
on X , it is possible to update Y immediately after updating X . However, this
is impossible, because also the updated values of Z are needed in the evaluation
of the new values for Y . The point is that, from X to Y , there is a longer
path than the direct one. This suggests defining a distance from X , d(X, ·),
given by the maximum length of paths from X to ·. Nodes at distance 1 can be
immediately evaluated after updating X ; at this point it is safe to update nodes
at distance 2; and so on. Nodes that are not accessible by directed paths from X
will be assigned a negative distance and excluded from the updating procedure.
Of course, this strategy will work provided there are no loops in the graph, or at
least no loops in the part of the graph which is accessible by directed paths from
X (the set of descendants of X). Since in the applications it is very common to
have conjunctive interventions, say do(X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn = xn), we will define,
more generally, the notion of distance from a set of variables X. In this more
complex case, one must consider a reduced graph in which all arrows entering
in X have been removed, and examine the directed paths of this reduced graph.
The reader may think of the card(X) = 1 case for ease of visualization.
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Definition 3.12. Given a graph G = (V, E) and X ⊆ V,
• We denote as G−X = (V, E−X) the graph obtained by removing all arrows
going into some vertex of X (i.e., an edge (V1, V2) is in E−X iff it is in
E and V2 /∈ X). Notice that, in the special case that X = {X}, the set of
directed paths of G−X starting from X coincides with the set of directed
paths of G starting from X.
• Let Y ∈ V. We call (evaluation) distance between X and Y the value
dG(X, Y ) = sup{lenght(P )|P dir. path of G−X going from some X ∈ X
to Y }. In case no such path exists, we set dG(X, Y ) = −1. Clearly, if the
graph is finite and acyclic, dG(X, Y ) ∈ N∪{−1} for any pair X, Y . When
the graph is clear from the context, we simply write d(X, Y ).
Let T be a fully explicit, recursive causal team of endogenous variables V.
Let X = {X1, . . . , Xn} ⊆ dom(T ) and x1 ∈ Ran(X1), . . . , xn ∈ Ran(Xn) cor-
responding values with the additional property that, if Xi and Xj denote the
same variable, then xi = xj . We define the intervention do(
∧
i=1..nXi = xi)
(in short, do(X = x)) as an algorithm5:
Stage 0. Delete all arrows coming into X, and replace each assignment s ∈ T
with s(x/X). Denote the resulting team6 as T0. Replace FT with its restriction
F ′T to V \X.
Stage n + 1. If {Z1, . . . , Zkn+1} is the set of all the variables Zj such that
dG(T )(X, Zj) = n + 1, define a new team Tn+1 by replacing each s ∈ Tn with
the assignment s(fZ1(s(PAZ1))/Z1, . . . , fZkn+1 (s(PAZkn+1 ))/Zkn+1).
End the procedure after step nˆ = sup{dG(T )(X, Z)|Z ∈ dom(T )}.
Notice that RT is not modified by the algorithm; and that, except for the
modifications to G(T ), it would be the same to apply the algorithm to each
assignment separately. In case the causal team T is recursive but not fully ex-
plicit, we should begin the algorithm with an additional step:
Step −1. Replace T with the corresponding fully explicit causal team TFE.
In case the intervention do(X = x) is a terminating algorithm on T , we
define the causal team TX=x (of endogenous variables V \X) as the quadruple
5Notice that our definition allows the presence of many occurrences of the same variable
in different conjuncts, provided that all such conjuncts assign the same value to the given
variable. We do not define interventions associated to contradictory conjunctions. E.g., the
intervention do(X = x ∧ X = x ∧ Y = y) is defined, and coincides with the intervention
do(X = x ∧ Y = y); while the intervention do(X = 1 ∧X = 2) is not defined.
6A warning: the teams Tn produced before the last step of the algorithm may fail to
form a causal team together with the other coomponents described, because of violations of
conditions b) and c) of the definition of causal team.
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(T nˆ, G(T )X ,RT ,F ′T ) which is produced when do(X = x) is applied to T . Ac-
tually, relaxing a bit the notion of algorithm, the do algorithm applies as well
to causal teams with infinite variable ranges:
Theorem 3.13. If G(T ) is a finite acyclic graph, then TX=x is well-defined.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that T is fully explicit.
Assume also, at first, that T− is finite.
Suppose that, for X ⊆ dom(T ), Y ∈ dom(T ), d(X, Y ) > card(G(T )). Then
there is a path P from some X ∈ X to Y such that lenght(P ) > card(G(T )).
Then there is a node which is crossed at least twice by P ; so G(T ) contains a
cycle: contradiction.
Therefore, sup{d(X, Z)|Z ∈ dom(T )} ≤ card(G(T )); this means that the
“for” cycle in the algorithm goes through a finite number of iterations over the
variable n.
Finally, notice that, for each n, there are a finite number of variables Z such
that d(X, Z) = n (due to finiteness of G(T )) and a finite number of assignments
t in the team that is undergoing modification (due to the finiteness of T−).
Therefore, the algorithm terminates after a finite number of steps.
If instead T− is infinite, we can replace do(X = x) with an infinitary al-
gorithm which, in each iteration of the “for” cycle, performs simultaneously
the substitution t →֒ t(fZ1(s(PAZ1))/Z1, . . . , fZkn+1 (s(PAZkn+1 ))/Zkn+1) for
all the assignments t in the current team. By the arguments above, such an
“algorithm” terminates and yields a well-defined causal team.
In case a causal team is not recursive (i.e., its graph is cyclic), the algorithm
above may well fail to terminate. In this case, a definition of the intervention
do(X = x) could still be given in terms of the set of solutions of the modified
system of structural equations (in which the equations for X are replaced by
X := x), provided the team is parametric. Each assignment s ∈ T is a solu-
tion of the system of structural equations encoded in FT (this is ensured by
parametricity and conditions a) and c) in the definition of causal team). Galles
and Pearl ([8]) consider the case of systems with unique solutions, defined as
follows: 1) for fixed values of the exogenous variables, the system has a unique
solution, and 2) each “intervened” system of equations obtained from the ini-
tial one replacing some equations of the form X := fX(PAX) with constant
equations X := x still has a unique solution for each choice of values for the
exogenous variables. In case the FT component of a team encodes a system with
unique solutions, then the natural way to define an intervention do(X = x) on
the team is to replace each assignment s ∈ T− with the (unique) assignment
t which encodes the solution of the intervened system for the choice s(U) of
values to the exogenous variables7. The definition of the other components of
the causal team produced by the intervention is straightforward. Over recursive
parametric causal teams the team so obtained coincides with the causal team
that is produced by the algorithm.
7In case the intervention acts also on some of the exogenous variables, this idea should be
modified in an obvious way.
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It is not difficult to extend the previous ideas to systems that may have no
solution at all. In case the intervened system obtained replacing the appropriate
equations with X = x has no solution corresponding to the choice s(U) for the
exogenous variables, then no assignment should correspond to s in the inter-
vened team TX=x. Although this extension is straightforward, we can expect
significant changes in the underlying logic.
The case of systems with multiple solutions is more problematic. If many
solutions correspond to an assignment of the initial team, should we include
them all in the intervened team? And, for what regards the probabilistic devel-
opments of the following sections, should we consider all the assignments thus
produced as equiprobable? These matters should probably be settled according
to the kind of interpretation we want to give to nonrecursive causal teams in a
given application, and one is lead to the classical problems of interpretation of
nonrecursive causal models (see e.g [28]). It might also be reasonable to model
such an intervention as producing not one, but multiple teams, corresponding to
possible different outcomes of the intervention. This set of “accessible teams”
would then induce a nontrivial modality, and it would then be reasonable to
treat counterfactuals as necessity operators in a dynamic logic setting (in the
spirit of [11]). This would lead us far away from the approach of the present
paper, in which we focus on the nonproblematic recursive case. We now return
to it.
Having defined the intervened team TX=x, we are immediately led to a
semantical clause for counterfactuals of the form X = x✷→ ψ:
T |= X = x✷→ ψ ⇐⇒ TX=x |= ψ.
In case the antecedent is inconsistent (i.e., it contains two conjuncts Xi =
xi, Xi = x
′
i with xi 6= x
′
i), the corresponding intervention is not defined; in this
case, we postulate the counterfactual to be (trivially) true.
3.9 Logical languages
We call the (basic) language of causal dependence, CD, the language formed by
the following rules:
Y = y | Y 6= y | =(X;Y ) | ψ ∧ χ | ψ ∧ χ | θ ⊃ χ | X = x✷→ χ
for Y,X variables, y,x values, ψ, χ formulae of CD, θ classical formula.
If we interpret this language by the semantical clauses introduced so far, it
can be shown that:
Theorem 3.14. The logic CD is downwards closed, that is: if ϕ ∈ CD, T is a
parametric causal team with at most unique solutions, T ′ is a causal subteam of
T , and T |= ϕ, then also T ′ |= ϕ.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the synctactical structure of ϕ. The atomic
and propositional cases are routine.
23
Suppose T |= ψ ⊃ χ. Then Tψ |= χ. Now T ′ψ ⊆ Tψ; therefore, by inductive
hypothesis, T ′ψ |= χ. Thus, by the semantic clause for selective implication,
T ′ |= ψ ⊃ χ.
Suppose T |= X = x✷→ χ. Then TX=x |= χ. But since the algorithm
do(X = x) acts on each assignment separately, we can conclude that (T ′X=x)
− ⊆
(TX=x)
−. So, by the inductive hypothesis, T ′X=x |= χ. Applying again the
semantic clause, T ′ |= X = x✷→ χ.
Theorem 3.15. The logic CD has the empty set property, that is: for every
ϕ ∈ CD, ∅ |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the syntax of the formula. The new cases are those for
⊃ and ✷→.
Let ϕ be ψ ⊃ χ. Notice that ∅ψ = ∅. Trivially, any assignment in it satisfies
χ. So ∅ |= ψ ⊃ χ.
Let ϕ be of the form X = x✷→ χ. Any do algorithm, applied to ∅, produces
∅ again; therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, ∅X=x = ∅ |= χ. Thus, by the
clause for counterfactuals we obtain ∅ |= X = x✷→ χ.
We also give names to some relevant fragments of CD:
• C: the counterfactual fragment, where symbols =(·; ·) and ⊃ are not al-
lowed
• CO: the causal-observational fragment where =(·; ·) is not allowed.
We may also define variants COneg, Cneg that are closed (except for antecedents
of counterfactuals) under a dual negation ¬, which satisfies the additional se-
mantical clause:
• T |= ¬ψ ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ T−, {s} 6|= ψ.8
We can show that the language COneg (and thus also CO, Cneg, C) satisfies
a much more restrictive condition: flatness. Here and in the following, we will
often abuse notation and write, say, {s} for a causal team T whose support T−
contains the single assignment s; we will then write {s}X=x for the causal team
TX=x, and so on.
Theorem 3.16. The logic COneg over unique-solution parametric causal teams
is flat, that is: for every formula ϕ of COneg and every unique-solution para-
metric causal team T , T |= ϕ iff {s} |= ϕ for every assignment s ∈ T−.
Proof. It can be shown by induction on the complexity of the involved formulas.
The cases related to propositional connectives are routine. We only have to
check the cases of ϕ = X = x✷→ χ and ϕ = ψ ⊃ χ.
Case ✷→) Suppose first that T |= X = x✷→ χ, with χ flat. Then by the
semantical clause for counterfactuals, TX=x |= χ. By flatness of χ, {t} |= χ
8This definition is reasonable due to the flatness of CO, which is entailed by theorem 3.16
below.
24
for each t ∈ (TX=x)−. Now, notice that {s} is a unique-solution causal team
(because T is such), which entails that, for every s ∈ T−, {s}X=x is again a
singleton causal team (see the details of the do algorithm). Therefore, by the
remarks above, {s}X=x |= χ for each s ∈ T ; so, by the semantical clauses,
{s} |= X = x✷→ χ for every s ∈ T .
In the other direction, suppose {s} |= X = x✷→ χ for every s ∈ T−. Then
for every s ∈ T−, {s}X=x |= χ. Again, any such causal team is a singleton set,
say {s}X=x =: {ts}. But notice that, if t is any assignment in (TX=x)−, then
t = ts for some s ∈ T−. So we can apply the inductive hypothesis and conclude
that TX=x |= χ. Therefore T |= X = x✷→ χ.
Case ⊃) Suppose T |= ψ ⊃ χ, with ψ, χ flat. Then, by the semantical clause
for ⊃, Tψ |= χ. By induction hypothesis, {s}ψ = {s} |= χ for each s ∈ (Tψ)−.
So {s} |= ψ ⊃ χ. Suppose instead s′ ∈ T is such that {s′} 6|= ψ. Then {s′}ψ = ∅.
Now {s′}ψ = ∅ |= χ; so, by the clause for ⊃, {s′} |= ψ ⊃ χ. In conclusion, for
any s ∈ T−, {s} |= ψ ⊃ χ.
Viceversa, suppose {s} |= ψ ⊃ χ for all s ∈ T−. Let s ∈ T− be such that
{s} |= ψ. Then {s}ψ = {s}; our assumption then yields {s} |= χ. Since χ is
flat, we can conclude that Tψ |= χ. So T |= ψ ⊃ χ.
This flatness theorem uses in an essential way the recursiveness of the causal
team. The previous downward closure and empty set property theorems may
work as well in the nonrecursive case, provided a definition of intervention is
given also in that case, along the lines sketched at the end of subsection 3.8.
Notice also that, unlike in similar results for team semantics (see e.g. [31]),
the truth of a flat formula in a causal team based on a singleton team uses,
through structural equations, information that goes beyond that which is en-
coded in the single assignment of the team. A singleton causal team can be
identified with a structural equation model, enriched with a description of an
actual state for all variables in the system; therefore, our flatness result can be
seen as expressing a sort of conservativity of the causal team semantics over
structural equation modeling. As long as one works within a sufficiently poor
language, statements on causal teams can be reduced to statements over multi-
ple enriched structural equation models; but as soon as further non-flat language
components are introduced, such as dependence atoms, or the probabilities and
the intuitionistic disjunction (see later sections), structural equation models be-
come insufficient, and causal teams are needed.
4 Some logical principles
In this section, we analyze some validities and inference rules for the languages
CD, CO and C when their semantics ranges over parametric, recursive causal
teams (we will assume this restriction throughout the section). Most observa-
tions extend also to unique solution causal teams.
We shall write ψ |= χ to mean that χ holds on any parametric, recursive
causal team on which ψ holds. By |= χ we mean that χ holds on any parametric,
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recursive causal team.
4.1 The law of excluded middle
Does the fact that the logic CO is flat entail that its propositional logic is
classical? The issue is somewhat problematic.
It is well known that in predicate logics of dependence and independence the
law of excluded middle fails; in the propositional case this point is more subtle.
We propose two formulations of the law of excluded middle, a weak one and a
stronger one that comes closer to the classical version:
(WEM) : |= ψ ∨ ¬ψ
(SEM) : For any team T, T |= ψ or T |= ¬ψ
Neither formulation covers the full classical scheme, because for many formulas
we lack negation. Within COneg, instead, SEM fundamentally corresponds to
the classical law of excluded middle.
It is very easy to find a counterexample to SEM, even at the atomic level.
Notice indeed that the following team
X
1
2
does not satisfy X = 1 nor its negation X 6= 1.
With regard to WEM, we get:
Theorem 4.1. All formulas in COneg satisfy WEM.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula of COneg. Let T be a team. Let T1 = {s ∈ T
−|{s} |=
ϕ}, and T2 = {s ∈ T−|{s} 6|= ϕ} = {s ∈ T−|{s} |= ¬ϕ}. Then, by flatness,
T1 |= ϕ and T2 |= ¬ϕ. By the clause for disjunction, T |= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
For trivial reasons (since it lacks negation of all but atomic formulas), CD
itself satisfies WEM. It is not obvious how to extend CD itself with a negation.
One way followed in the literature is to treat the negation of a dependence
atom as satisfied only by the empty team. In this case, one immediately finds
counterexamples to WEM.
Another possibility would be to extend CD with a contradictory negation of
the dependence atom:
• T |= 6= (X;Y ) ⇐⇒ there are s, s′ ∈ T such that s(X) = s′(X) but
s(Y ) 6= s′(Y ).
This option does not save WEM, either: just let T be any team that satisfies
the atom =(X;Y ). Then, in any partition T1, T2 of T , both parts satisfy the
atom, and not its negation (also in case one of the two subteams is the empty
subteam). Notice also the failure of the empty set property.
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4.2 Conditional excluded middle
In the present section we consider the law that is commonly called conditional
excluded middle:
(CEM) : |= ψ ✷→ (χ ∨ ¬χ).
This is often considered in pair with the formally similar law called distribution:
(D) : ψ ✷→ (χ ∨ χ′) |= [(ψ ✷→ χ) ∨ (ψ ✷→ χ′)]
These principles are known to hold for Stalnaker counterfactuals and fail for
Lewis counterfactuals. We will show in a later subsection (4.6) that distribution
is valid for our languages. Here we focus mainly on the CEM law.
What about systems of interventionist counterfactuals, such as those given
by Galles and Pearl ([8]), Halpern ([11]) and Briggs ([2])? In the system consid-
ered by Galles and Pearl, only atomic consequents are allowed; therefore CEM
and D have no instances. For what regards the remaining systems, these funda-
mentally evaluate formulas on single assignments, that we might think as sin-
gleton causal teams. Each intervention produces again an assignment/singleton
team. Therefore, CEM trivially holds for atomic consequents. Simple induc-
tion arguments allow to extend this observation to all the formulas of the lan-
guage considered by Halpern (which allow boolean operators in the consequents
of counterfactuals). Briggs also allows disjunctions and negations in the an-
tecedents of counterfactuals; we do not consider this possibility in the paper.
The languages of these papers also have an operator corresponding to classical
implication; therefore, D can be internalized and shown to hold in there, as is
done explicitly in [11].
As far as causal teams are concerned, by the flatness of COneg , CEM holds
in COneg, and therefore also in CD. However, it is natural to wonder about a
corresponding semantical property:
(CEM ′) : For every causal team T , T |= θ✷→ χ or T |= θ ✷→ ¬χ
We show that CEM’ can fail in very simple examples on causal teams; there-
fore, our logic does not coincide with that of usual interventionist counterfactu-
als. The simplest possible counterexample is of the form:
T :
X Y
1 1
1 2
The intervention do(X = 1) does not modify this team, that is: TX=1 = T .
On the other hand, T 6|= Y = 1, and T 6|= Y 6= 1. So, T 6|= X = 1✷→ Y = 1,
and T 6|= X = 1✷→ Y 6= 1. Thus, CEM’ is falsified.
The peculiarity of this example might suggest that the failure of these laws
could be attributed to the fact that there are no arrows between the variables
of concern. This is not the case, as we can show with a slightly more complex
example. Consider the team
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S:
X Z Y
1 1 2
2 2 4
where the behavior of Y is determined by the function FS(Y )(X,Z) :=
X + Z. The intervention do(X = 1) generates the team
SX=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
It is then immediate to verify that S neither satisfies X = 1✷→ Y = 2 nor
X = 1✷→ Y 6= 2, thereby falsifying CEM’.
4.3 Interactions between implications and dependencies
As causal team semantics defines both dependencies based on correlations (func-
tional dependence) and causal and counterfactual dependencies, it allows us to
investigate the logical principles which govern their interaction. Here we list
some of the inference rules that connect the various kinds of dependence that
are referred to within the language CD; the simple soundness proofs are left to
the reader.
Given that the selective implication is strongly analogous to classical im-
plication, the following inference rules hold (assuming the classicality of all
antecedents):
θ ⊃ χ
(θ ∧ ψ) ⊃ χ
θ ⊃ χ
θ ⊃ (χ ∨ ψ)
θ ⊃ (χ ⊃ ψ)
(θ ∧ χ) ⊃ ψ
the third of which is also invertible. The second rule can be expected to fail in
logics that lack the empty set property.
It is time to make the relationship between selective and classical implica-
tion more explicit. First of all, notice that a restricted version of a semantic
Deduction Theorem holds for selective implication: if any team that satisfies a
classical formula θ also satisfies χ, then this in particular holds for any team of
the form T θ; therefore T θ |= χ, from which we obtain T |= θ ⊃ χ (for any causal
team T ). Therefore, all the valid inference rules that are stated in this section
can be internalized in the formal language as selective implications, provided the
antecedents are classical formulas9.
Secondly, we wish to establish whether our approach, of allowing selective
implications, is equivalent or not to the approach of adding to our languages the
dual negations of all classical formulas; could then a selective implication θ ⊃ χ
9We might consider extending our languages by allowing flat instead of classical antecedents
for selective implications. This would extend the range of application of the Deduction The-
orem, but would have the drawback that the syntax of the resulting language might not be
decidable anymore.
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be replaced by an expression of the form ¬θ∨χ?The answer is yes for downward
closed logics, as those that we have considered thus far; but the approach via
selective implication is more general. The point is this: applying the clause
for disjunction, T |= ¬θ ∨ χ holds if and only if there are S1, S2 ⊆ T− such
that S2 |= χ and, for all s ∈ S1, {s} 6|= θ. Then (T
θ)− ⊆ S2; if the logic
under consideration is downward closed, then, we can conclude that T θ |= χ,
that is, T |= θ ⊃ χ. But it is easy to find counterexamples in logics that are
not downward closed. Consider for example the (marginal) independence atoms
X ⊥ Y defined (along the lines of [10]) by the semantical clause:
• T |= X ⊥ Y ⇐⇒ for every s, s′ ∈ T− there is an s′′ ∈ T− s.t. s′′(X) =
s(X) and s′′(Y ) = s′(Y ).
Then the following team
U :
X Y
1 1
1 2
2 1
2 2
satisfiesX 6= 1∨X ⊥ Y (just consider the partition of U into ∅ and U ; ∅ |= X 6= 1
and U |= X ⊥ Y ). But U 6|= X = 1 ⊃ X ⊥ Y .
We now turn to the relationship between selective and counterfactual impli-
cation. We start by showing that their commutativity, that is, the equivalence
between θ ✷→ (χ ⊃ ψ) and χ ⊃ (θ ✷→ ψ) fails in causal teams in both di-
rections. We show this by a couple of counter-examples. For all the teams
involved, the graph will be {{X,Y, Z}, {(X,Y ), (Z, Y )}} (so, we do not draw it
every time) and the only structural equation will be Y := X+Z; it is not really
important to specify the ranges of variables. Consider the following teams:
T :
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
2 3 5
TX=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
1 3 4
(TX=1)
X=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
1 3 4
TX=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
(TX=1)X=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
From the tables, it is immediate to see that T |= X = 1 ⊃ (X = 1✷→ (Y =
2 ∨ Y = 3)), but T 6|= X = 1✷→ (X = 1 ⊃ (Y = 2 ∨ Y = 3)).
A counterexample for the opposite direction is given by the following teams,
with graph and equation as before:
S:
X Z Y
1 1 2
1 2 3
2 1 3
SZ=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
2 1 3
(SZ=1)
Y=3:
X Z Y
2 1 3
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SY=3:
X Z Y
1 2 3
2 1 3
(SY=3)Z=1:
X Z Y
1 1 2
2 1 3
which show that S |= Z = 1✷→ (Y = 3 ⊃ Y = 3) but S 6|= Y = 3 ⊃ (Z =
1✷→ Y = 3).
The noncommutativity of ✷→ with ⊃ is a phenomenon that, to the best of
our knowledge, has no analogous in the usual notations of the causal inference
literature; we return to this point in Section 6.3.
In our search for further rules linking ✷→ and ⊃, we can now have a look
at the literature on Stalnaker-Lewis counterfactuals, and check whether in some
case ⊃ may take the role that in Stalnaker-Lewis rules is taken by material
implication. For example, it is known that 1) a Stalnaker-Lewis counterfactual
θ ✷→ χ implies the corresponding material conditional θ → χ, and 2) the con-
verse holds, provided θ holds. It might be interesting to inquire whether similar
principles hold for our counterfactual and selective implication, respectively.
The literature on causation seems to suggest a negative answer: looking for
example at rule 2 of Pearl’s do calculus ([22], sec. 3.4) we see that, in some lan-
guages that also allow the discussion of probabilities, replacing an intervention
with an observation, or viceversa, can be done only under some graph-theoretical
(and not logical) assumptions. Explicit counterexamples to 1) and 2) can be
constructed in our languages, following the lines of [2] (sect. 3.1 and 4), for
some formulas in which the consequent χ is itself a counterfactual. The coun-
terexample in [2] is based on the famous “execution line” example ([22]), but we
can construct a much simpler one. Consider the following causal teams, with
boolean ranges and invariant functions fY (X) := X and fZ(X,Y ) := X ∧ Y :
T = T Y=0: X Y Z
0 0 0
(T Y=0)X=1: X Y Z
1 1 1
TY=0: X Y Z
0 0 0
(TY=0)X=1 X Y Z
1 0 0
It is then immediate to see that T |= Y = 0✷→ (X = 1✷→ Z 6= 1) but
T 6|= Y = 0 ⊃ (X = 1✷→ Z 6= 1). The important element in this example
(and similar ones) is that we have an intervention do(Y = 0) which does not
modify the team component of the causal team, but modifies the graph – which
encodes counterfactual relations.
Other simple examples could be constructed for consequents which contain
probabilistic statements – we will define a semantics for them in later sections.
We could not find, instead, a counterexample with consequents that involve
only selective implications, dependence atoms and connectives; but here is a
counterexample using selective implications and contradictory negations of de-
pendence atoms, as defined in subsection 4.1. Consider the following causal
teams, with invariant function fZ(X,Y ) := Y :
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S:
X Y Z
0 0 0
1 1 1
(SX=0) = (SX=0)
X=0:
X Y Z
0 0 0
0 1 1
SX=0 = (SX=0)X=0: X Y Z
0 0 0
Then S |= X = 0✷→ (X = 0 ⊃6=(X ;Z)) but S 6|= X = 0 ⊃ (X = 0 ⊃6=
(X ;Z)). Of course, it is questionable whether we should allow this kind of arrow
X → Z in our definition of causal teams.
Let us now see how dependence atoms interact with the two kinds of impli-
cation. For what regards selective implication, the following rules are valid:
=(X;Y )
X = x ⊃=(Y )
∧
x∈Ran(X)
∨
y∈Ran(Y )(X = x ⊃ Y = y)
=(X;Y )
.
As a simple special case of the second rule, we have that Y = y implies =(Y ).
An analogous rule holds for counterfactual implication:
∧
x∈Ran(X)
∨
y∈Ran(Y )(X = x✷→ Y = y)
=(X;Y )
.
but the implication from =(X;Y ) toX = x✷→=(Y ) only holds on teams where
the tuple x occurs.
4.4 Permutation and exportation/importation of antecedents
Consider the following laws of permutation, exportation and importation of an-
tecedents:
(P ) : ψ ✷→ (ψ′ ✷→ χ) ≡ ψ′ ✷→ (ψ ✷→ χ)
(E) : (ψ ∧ ψ′)✷→ χ |= ψ ✷→ (ψ′ ✷→ χ)
(I) : ψ ✷→ (ψ′ ✷→ χ) |= (ψ ∧ ψ′)✷→ χ
These laws famously fail for Stalnaker’s ([27]) and Lewis’ ([18]) counterfactuals;
see [24], chap. 8; they are also claimed to fail, in general, for natural language
counterfactuals. The purpose of this section is to show that under some restric-
tion (that the variables mentioned in ψ and, resp. ψ′ be distinct) these laws are
valid for our counterfactuals. Under this restriction (which will be somewhat
relaxed in the next section), exportation/importation amounts to the statement
that an intervention over a set of variables can be split into successive interven-
tions over disjoint subsets of variables; permutation corresponds to the assertion
the two interventions of this kind can be performed in any order.
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Remark 4.2. We assume in this subsection that causal teams are explicit.
However, the results presented here hold for non-explicit causal teams as well,
although the proofs in that case are more involved.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be a finite acyclic graph, X, Y,W vertices of G with W ∈
PAY , Y /∈ X and Y reachable from X (that is, d(X, Y ) ≥ 0). Then d(X,W ) <
d(X, Y ).
Proof. d(X, Y ) = sup{lenght(P )|P directed path of G−X from some X ∈ X
to Y }. But any directed path from X to W is included in some path from
this set. So d(X,W ) ≤ d(X, Y ).
Assume first that at least one path from X to W exists in G−X. Since G
is finite and acyclic, d(X,W ) = n ∈ N. Let P be a path of G−X from some
X ∈ X to W of lenght n. Then P ∪ {(W,Y )} is a path of G−X from X to
Y of lenght n + 1. This holds for any X ∈ X. Since X is finite, d(X, Y ) =
maxX∈X d(X,Y ) > maxX∈X d(X,W ) = d(X,W ).
If instead no path from X to W exists, then d(X,W ) = −1, and the claim
of the Lemma is satisfied.
In the next theorem exportation and importation of antecedents are ex-
pressed as rules. A more general version will be proved later on (Theorem 4.8).
Theorem 4.4. Let T be a causal team with G(T ) finite acyclic, X,Y ∈ dom(T )
such that X ∩ Y = ∅, x ∈ Ran(X), and y ∈ Ran(Y). Then TX=x∧Y=y =
(TX=x)Y=y. Therefore, the following rules
(IMP ) :
X = x✷→ (Y = y ✷→ χ)
(X = x ∧Y = y)✷→ χ
(EXP ) :
(X = x ∧Y = y)✷→ χ
X = x✷→ (Y = y✷→ χ)
are valid, under the above restrictions, over recursive teams.
Proof. Notice first that for any s′ ∈ (TX=x)Y=y and any s′′ ∈ TX=x∧Y=y,
s′(X) = s′′(X) = x and s′(Y) = s′′(Y) = y.
Secondly, the restriction to explicit causal teams implies that FT ⊇ FTX=x ⊇
F(TX=x)Y=y = FTX=x∧Y=y .
Fix s ∈ T . Let s′ ∈ (TX=x)Y=y be the assignment obtained by applying to
{s} the intervention do(X = x) followed by do(Y = y), and s′′ the assignment
obtained by applying do(X = x ∧Y = y) to s. We shall prove, by a simulta-
neous induction on m and n, that s′(Z) = s′′(Z) for any variable Z such that
d(X, Z) ≤ m and d(Y, Z) ≤ n. In the base case Z ∈ X ∪ Y, this result is
obvious.
Suppose that the statement holds for m and n, and let Z ∈ dom(T )\(X∪Y)
be a variable such that d(X, Z) ≤ m and d(Y, Z) = n + 1 (the proof of the
symmetric case is analogous).
From the algorithm do(Y = y), it follows that s′(Z) = FTX=x(Z)(s
′(PAZ))
(notice indeed that, thanks to acyclicity, the algorithm does not modify the
PAZ-columns after modifying the Z-column), which, by the observation above,
is equal to FT (Z)(s′(PAZ)); and from the algorithm do(X = x ∧ Y = y), it
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follows that s′′(Z) = FT (Z)(s′′(PAZ)). By Lemma 4.3 (which we can apply
because d(Y, Z) = n + 1 implies Z /∈ Y), the variables in PAZ have strictly
smaller distances from Y than Z (and, obviously, at most the same distance
fromX). Then, by the inductive hypothesis, s′(PAZ) = s
′′(PAZ). So, applying
FT (Z), we obtain s
′(Z) = s′′(Z).
As a corollary, we obtain the following variant of the permutation rule:
Theorem 4.5. Let T be a causal team with G(T ) finite acyclic, X,Y ∈ dom(T )
such that X ∩ Y = ∅, x ∈ ran(X), and y ∈ ran(Y). Then (TX=x)Y=y =
(TY=y)X=x. Therefore, the following rule
(PERM) :
X = x✷→ (Y = y ✷→ χ)
Y = y✷→ (X = x✷→ χ)
is valid, under the above restrictions, over recursive causal teams.
Proof. From Theorem 4.4 we obtain the equalities (TX=x)Y=y = TX=x∧Y=y
and (TY=y)X=x = TY=y∧X=x. Since the order of variables is irrelevant in the
definition of the do algorithm, we also have TX=x∧Y=y = TY=y∧X=x. Transi-
tivity yields the desired result.
4.5 Generalized import-export and permutation rules
The purpose of this section is to show that the assumptions of the permuta-
tion and the import-export rules can be relaxed in the following way: if the
interventions involved are over two sets of variables X and Y with nonempty
intersection, we have only to require that the two interventions act “in the same
way” over the common set of variables X ∩Y.
Lemma 4.6. For any X ⊆ dom(T ), (TX=x)X=x = TX=x.
Proof. By a simple induction on the steps of the “for” cycle in the do algorithm.
Lemma 4.7. Let T be a causal team with G(T ) finite acyclic, X,Y ∈ dom(T ),
x ∈ Ran(X), and y ∈ Ran(Y). Suppose also that, if Xi = Yj ∈ X ∩ Y,
then xi = yj. Let Y
′ = Y \X, and y′ = {yj|Yj ∈ Y′}. Then (TX=x)Y=y =
(TX=x)Y′=y′ .
Proof. Let X′ = X \ Y, and x′ = {xj |Xj ∈ X′}. Let Z = X ∩ Y and z =
x ∩ y. Applying twice Theorem 4.4 (import-export), we get (TX=x)Y=y =
(((TX′=x′)Z=z)Z=z)Y′=y′ . But this last term is equal to ((TX′=x′)Z=z)Y′=y′ , by
Lemma 4.6. Given that Z and X′ are disjoint, we can apply again Theorem 4.4
to obtain ((TX′=x′)Z=z)Y′=y′ = (TX=x)Y′=y′ . The chain of equalities yields the
desired result.
Next we show that the import-export rule works under the weaker hypothesis
that the two interventions act in the same way on the shared set of variables.
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Theorem 4.8. Let T be a causal team with G(T ) finite acyclic, X,Y ∈ dom(T ).
x ∈ ran(X), and y ∈ ran(Y). Suppose also that, if Xi = Yj ∈ X ∩ Y, then
xi = yj. Then TX=x∧Y=y = (TX=x)Y=y.
Proof. Apply Lemma 4.7 to see that (TX=x)Y=y = (TX=x)Y′=y′ , where Y
′ =
Y \ X. Given that X and Y′ are disjoint sets of variables, we can use the
weak import-export rule (Theorem 4.4) to obtain (TX=x)Y′=y′ = TX=x∧Y′=y′ .
But now the formula X = x ∧ Y = y differs from X = x ∧ Y′ = y′ only
in that it contains some repetitions of conjuncts that are already present in
X = x ∧ Y′ = y′. Therefore, the two formulas define the same interventions
(as can be seen by checking the do algorithm); this immediately implies that
TX=x∧Y=y = TX=x∧Y′=y′ . The whole chain of equalities yields the result.
Again, under these hypotheses the order of the interventions is irrelevant.
Theorem 4.9. Let T be a causal team with G(T ) finite acyclic, X,Y ∈ dom(T ),
x ∈ ran(X), and y ∈ ran(Y). Suppose also that, if Xi = Yj ∈ X ∩ Y, then
xi = yj. Then (TX=x)Y=y = (TY=y)X=x.
Proof. This works like the proof of Theorem 4.5, using the relaxed import-export
rule (Theorem 4.8) instead of Theorem 4.4.
4.6 Composition and effectiveness rules
Galles and Pearl ([8]) present a complete and sound system for interventionist
counterfactuals over recursive causal models (to be more precise, the result holds
only for causal models that are parametric and under the restriction that the
range of each variable is finite). This system is based on two main rules called
composition and effectiveness. In informal presentations ([22]), Pearl claims
that these two axioms exhaust the system; a closer look at the original paper
(and at a subsequent clarifying paper by Halpern, [11]) shows that two further
axioms (definiteness and uniqueness), plus “the rules of logic” are part of the
system. Let us first point out that Pearl uses a very different syntax from ours
which originates in a tradition of representation of counterfactuals common in
the statistical literature (the “potential outcome” approach, [21],[23]). He uses
Yx(u) = y
to mean that, in an actual state in which the (set of) exogenous variables U take
values u, if we fixed the value of X to x by an intervention, then Y would take
value y. Given that in a recursive structural equation model the endogenous
variables are functionally determined by the exogenous ones, we can represent
such an assignment u of values to the exogenous variables as a unique assignment
su. Therefore, we might represent Pearl’s counterfactual in a notation closer to
the logical tradition as:
su |= X = x✷→ Y = y.
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Assuming that, unless otherwise specified, variables and values are implicitly
universally quantified, here is now the list of properties that Galles and Pearl
ascribe to causal models with unique solutions (which include recursive models):
(Composition) :Wx(u) = w ⇒ Yxw(u) = Yx(u)
(Effectiveness) : Xxw(u) = x
(Definiteness) : there is an x such that Xy(u) = x
(Uniqueness) : Xy(u) = x ∧Xy(u) = x
′ ⇒ x = x′
to which, according to Halpern ([11]), we should add all classical propositional
tautologies plus Modus Ponens. A further axiom scheme (call it REC) forces
the system to be recursive (i.e., the graph to be acyclic). Translating the REC
axiom into our language is somewhat problematic; we consider this issue towards
the end of the present subsection.
Do these axioms hold for our causal teams? First of all, we should decide
how these axioms should be interpreted in our framework. One possible way to
go is to conceive these counterfactuals as encoding properties of a team instead
of an actual state; that is, to have a team T play the role that was previously
played by u (or by su). It is then straightforward to translate effectiveness as
the statement that each causal team T satisfies:
(EFF ) :|= (X = x ∧W = w)✷→ X = x.
Translating composition is a more complex task. First of all, Galles&Pearl have
an operator ⇒ which is most likely intended as a material implication (which,
by the deduction theorem, reflects logical implication). We do not have in CD
any such operator (we know that our selective implication ⊃ obeys a deduction
theorem, but only for CO antecedents). For this reason, we will focus here on
the languages Cneg and COneg, which are flat and closed under dual negation.
We can therefore add modus ponens in the following form:
MP∨ :
θ ¬θ ∨ χ
χ
.
However, in order to facilitate the transition to more general languages like
CD, which are not closed under negation, we may also adopt the strategy of
rewriting all the implications corresponding to Pearl’s axioms as inference rules.
For example, it will be reasonable to move from the formal language to the
semantic metalanguage, and think of composition as a rule of inference rather
than an axiom. The composition rule poses a further problem: the formula
Yxw(u) = Yx(u) is not a counterfactual. We may think instead of the equivalent
expression (for all y ∈ R(Y )): Yxw(u) = y ⇐⇒ Yx(u) = y. It then becomes
natural to decompose “composition” into two rules of inference:
(CE) :
X = x✷→W = w (X = x ∧W = w)✷→ Y = y
X = x✷→ Y = y
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(CI) :
X = x✷→W = w X = x✷→ Y = y
(X = x ∧W = w)✷→ Y = y
Definiteness (“Decidability”) contains an existential quantification. If we as-
sume the ranges of variables to be finite, then we can formulate this axiom in a
way that works relativized to teams that have a specific finite range for X :
(DEC) : ∨x∈Ran(X)(Y = y✷→ X = x)
What this axiom expresses about a team is that the team can be decomposed
into subteams, each of which satisfies, after the intervention do(Y = y), one of
the X = x atoms; it is true of any parametric causal team (in the nonparametric
case, the disjunction should not be taken over Ran(X), but over Ran(X) ∪
TermG(T )).
The uniqueness axiom mentions formulas of the form x = x′, which are
absent from our language. But we can think of a reformulation of these axioms
due to Halpern (which he simply calls the “equality” axiom scheme), which
rephrases it as a scheme of rules of inference (one rule for each variable X , set
of variables Y, and pair of values x, x′ ∈ Ran(X) with x 6= x′):
(UNI) :
Y = y✷→ X = x
Y = y✷→ X 6= x′
The import of this axiom seems much weaker than in the Galles-Pearl case,
given that X = x and X 6= x′ are global statements over many assignments.
Our translations of the axioms and rules all fall within the language Cneg.
By its flatness, it immediately follows that the axioms EFF and the appropriate
instances of DEC also hold for our causal teams.
Theorem 4.10. The rules CE, CI and UNI are sound for parametric acyclic
causal teams.
Proof. CE) Assume T satisfies the two assumptions of the rule. Since the con-
sequent Y = y of the counterfactuals involved is a formula that does not con-
tain counterfactuals, in order to prove that T satisfies the conclusion of the
rule, it is sufficient to show that (TX=x)
− = (TX=x∧W=w)
−. In case W ∈ X,
the rule holds for trivial reasons. Otherwise, a previous theorem (4.4) tells
us that TX=x∧W=w = (TX=x)W=w . The first assumption of CE tells us that
TX=x |= W = w. But then, obviously, applying do(W = w) to TX=x leaves its
underlying team unvaried.
CI) An analogous argument.
UNI) Immediate.
Finally, notice that, by the flatness of Cneg, all classical validities that can be
formulated in Cneg are sound for acyclic teams. (But remember that some clas-
sical semantic principles, like SEM, fail). Halpern ([11]) considers a language
Luniq that allows boolean formulas as consequents, and boolean combinations of
counterfactuals, but does not allow embeded counterfactuals. This language can
be identified with an appropriate fragment of Cneg, call it Cu . What Halpern
36
shows is that the axioms described above form a sound and complete system
for Luniq over recursive (i.e. acyclic) causal models. In particular, they axiom-
atize the set of valid formulas of the Galles-Pearl language (which is restricted
to conjunctions of counterfactuals of the form X = x✷→ Y = y), although
derivations may use formulas that are not part of the Galles-Pearl language.
As we have seen, these axioms and rules are sound also for Cneg, over recur-
sive causal teams. But unlike Cu, the language Cneg also allows counterfactual
conditionals to occur in the consequents. Thus it may be that some more axioms
are needed in order to obtain a complete system for Cneg over recursive causal
teams.
Our strategy for the rest of this section is to show that any counterfactual
in Cneg is equivalent to a counterfactual with a ”simple” consequent (i.e., a
consequent which does not contain embedded counterfactuals, or even atomic
formulas of the form Y 6= y), and to isolate the rules that allow this transfor-
mation.
Our first observation is that Halpern [11] proves that recursive causal models
(or, more generally, causal models whose equations have unique solutions) satisfy
some rules that allow removing connectives from consequents. In our language,
these rules may be stated as follows:
(OR −OUT ) :
X = x✷→ ψ ∨ ψ′
(X = x✷→ ψ) ∨ (X = x✷→ ψ′)
(AND −OUT ) :
X = x✷→ ψ ∧ ψ′
(X = x✷→ ψ) ∧ (X = x✷→ ψ′)
(NEG−OUT ) :
X = x✷→ ¬ψ
¬(X = x✷→ ψ)
Halpern also shows the soundness of their inverses (call them OR-IN, AND-IN,
NEG-IN). We check now that the same holds in our causal teams.
Lemma 4.11. Suppose a causal team of the form TX=x has causal subteams
U ′, V ′ such that (U ′)− ∪ (V ′)− = (TX=x)−. Then T has causal subteams U, V
such that UX=x = U
′ and VX=x = V
′.
Proof. Let T, U ′, V ′ as above. For each t ∈ (TX=x)−, define the set of as-
signments St = {s ∈ T
−|{s}X=x = {t}}. Define then U
− :=
⋃
t∈U ′ St and
V − :=
⋃
t∈V ′ St. Define G(U),FU , etc. in the obvious way.
Let us show that U, V behave as wanted. Let t ∈ (U ′)−. Pick an s ∈ St ⊆
U−. {s}X=x = {t}; so, t ∈ (UX=x)−. This proves (U ′)− ⊆ (UX=x)−.
Let t /∈ (U ′)−. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is s ∈ U such
that {s}X=x = {t}. But then there is a t′ ∈ U ′ such that s ∈ St′ ⊆ U−. But
this implies that {t} = {s}X=x = {t′}. Therefore t ∈ (U ′)−: contradiction.
Theorem 4.12. The rules OR-OUT, AND-OUT, NEG-OUT, OR-IN, AND-
IN, NEG-IN are sound for Cneg on parametric causal teams with unique solu-
tions; except for NEG-IN/OUT, this also holds in CD.
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Proof. The AND and NOT case are straightforward. The soundness of OR-
OUT/OR-IN follows immediately from Lemma 4.11.
How should we treat counterfactuals occurring in the consequent? The im-
portation rule presented in previous sections (Theorem 4.8) can eliminate them
only under some synctactical restrictions. We need a different inference rule
that may work without restrictions. We prove here that, if two consecutive in-
terventions affect some common set of variables, then the action performed by
the first intervention on these common variables is completely overwritten by
the second intervention.
Lemma 4.13. Let T be a recursive causal team, X ⊆ dom(T ), and x,x′ ∈
Ran(X). Then (TX=x)X=x′ = TX=x′ .
Proof. Since all the interventions act on the same set of variables X, they give
rise to the same graph. A straightforward induction on d(X, Y ) can be used
to show that, for any s ∈ T , if {t} = ({s}X=x)X=x′ and {t′} = {s}X=x′, then
t(Y ) = t′(Y ) for any Y ∈ dom(T ).
Theorem 4.14. Let T be a recursive causal team, X,Y ⊆ dom(T ), X′ = X\Y
and x′ = x \ y. Then (TX=x)Y=y = (TX′=x′)Y=y.
Proof. Let Y′ = Y \ X and y′ = y \ x. Let Z = X ∩ Y. Suppose Z =
(Xi1 , . . . , Xik) = (Yj1 , . . . , Yjk). Write z1 for (xi1 , . . . , xik ) (the restriction of x
to values for Z), and z2 for (yj1 , . . . , yjk) (the restriction of y to values for Z).
Then, by Theorem 4.4, (TX=x)Y=y = (((TX′=x′)Z=z1)Z=z2)Y′=y′ . By Lemma
4.13, this is equal to ((TX′=x′)Z=z2)Y′=y′ . Applying Theorem 4.4 again, we
obtain (TX′=x′)Y=y.
This result, combined with Theorem 4.4, can be immediately turned into a
pair of inference rules:
(CF −OUT ) :
X = x✷→ (Y = y✷→ ψ)
(X′ = x′ ∧Y = y)✷→ ψ
where X′ = X\Y and x′ = x\y. Its inverse, CF-IN, works for X′∩Y = ∅ and
X ⊇ X′. This pair of rules corresponds essentially to the axiom CM11 proposed
by Briggs ([2], sect. 4).
Finally, we return to the axiom REC in Halpern ([11]), which characterizes
recursive systems. Halpern shows how to represent, in the potential outcome
formalism, the notion “X affects Y under some intervention” (we believe this
notion is the same as Woodward’s notion of contributing cause). We were not
able to express this notion in Cneg. Instead we can express it in an extended lan-
guage Cneg(⊔) where we allow positive occurrences of the so-called intuitionistic
disjunction ⊔, which follows the semantical clause:
T |= ψ ⊔ ψ′ ⇐⇒ T |= ψ or T |= ψ′
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With this additional connective, “X affects Y ” can be written as follows; write
NDX for the set of nondescendants ofX , andW := {Z ⊂ dom(T )\{X,Y }|NDX ⊆
Z}:
CC(X,Y ) :
⊔{
Z = z✷→ [(X = x✷→ Y = y) ∧ (X = x′ ✷→ Y = y′)]
}
.
where the disjunction is taken over all Z ∈ W , z ∈ Ran(Z), x 6= x′ ∈ Ran(X), y 6=
y′ ∈ Ran(Y ). Then in Cneg(⊔) we can write:
(RECk) :
CC(X1, X2) . . . CC(Xn−1, Xn)
¬CC(Xn, X1)
and take REC to be the set of all the RECk rules, for k ∈ N, k ≥ 2.
Given a causal team T , let AXC [T ]
10 be the axiom system constituted of
axiom schemes EFF; DEC; UNI; and the rules CE, CI, OR/AND/NEG/CF-
OUT, OR/AND/NEG/CF-IN, MP∨ and REC. Now AXC [T ] is a set of valid
Cneg(⊔) formulas and sound rules for Cneg(⊔), but we can show it to be complete
for the restricted set of formulas Cneg :11
Theorem 4.15. AXC [T ] is a sound and complete axiom system for the language
Cneg on recursive causal teams of domain dom(T ) and range function RT .
Proof. Soundness in Cneg was shown above; it is not difficult to show that
soundness extends to Cneg(⊔). Let Γ ⊆ Cneg, ϕ ∈ Cneg be such that ϕ holds
in any recursive causal team on which Γ holds. Notice that any ψ ∈ Γ can be
transformed into a ψ′ ∈ Cu by repeated applications of OR/AND/NEG/CF-
OUT; call Γ′ the set of the ψ′. By the soundness and invertibility of the rules,
Γ and Γ′ hold in the same causal teams. Similarly, ϕ can be transformed into a
ϕ′ ∈ Cu such that ϕ and ϕ′ hold in the same causal teams. Therefore, in order to
prove completeness, we only have to show that, whenever Γ′ ⊢ ϕ′ according to
the (translation of the) axiom system of Halpern, we can construct a derivation
Γ ⊢AXC[T ] ϕ.
For suppose we have a derivation Γ′ ⊢ ϕ′ in Halpern’s axiom system. Then
we can compose it with a derivation of Γ′ from Γ (using the OUT rules) and a
derivation of ϕ from ϕ′ (using the IN rules) to obtain a derivation of ϕ from Γ
within AXC [T ] (after Halpern’s rules and axioms are replaced with our transla-
tions).
The logic COneg is, again, flat and closed under dual negation. The obvious
way to obtain a complete axiomatization for COneg is then to add to AXC [T ]
the conversion rule
(SELE) :
θ ⊃ χ
¬θ ∨ χ
10The extra parameter T is there because we need, as was done in [11], to restrict the
axioms to teams which share the same “signature” as T , that is, they have the same domain
of variables and the same ranges for each of the variables.
11The approach which consists of defining a formal system over a language more general
than the set of target formulas is not unheard of; it is for example the approach taken in [8].
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and its inverse SELI , which allow to reduce the problem to that of completeness
of Cneg.
Notice that SELE is valid also for non-flat logics, of course under the restric-
tion that θ be flat (and its negation be present in the language); the validity of
SEL−I, instead, requires downward closure of the logic.
An alternative approach to obtain a complete axiomatization of COneg is
to add a rule for the extraction of selective implications from counterfactual
consequents:
(SEL−OUT ) :
X = x✷→ (ψ ⊃ χ)
(X = x✷→ ψ) ⊃ (X = x✷→ χ)
and its inverse SEL-IN. These rules are sound for COneg and are both likely to
hold (for the appropriate instances) also in languages that are not downward
closed.
5 The nonparametric case: falsifiability and ad-
missibility
We have allowed, in our causal teams, the possibility of having incomplete in-
formation concerning the invariant functions that relate the variables, up to the
extreme case where no information at all is present (except for the set of argu-
ments of the function, and the range of its allowed values). As a consequence,
it is in general impossible to fill the counterfactual causal teams generated by
interventions with proper values; if we do not have sufficient information to fill
an entry with a value, we fill it instead with a formal term which describes the
functional dependence of this entry on the values of other variables.
But how should we evaluate counterfactual statements which involve vari-
ables whose columns cannot be filled with proper values? We think it should not
be possible to ascribe truth values to such statements by the usual clauses. For
example, we are not entitled to assert that Y = 3 in a team whose non-formal
entries for Y are all equal to 3.
Yet in some cases we might be able to observe the falsity of similar state-
ments; therefore, to state their contradictory negation. Let us write ↓ s(X) to
signify that s(X) is a proper value and not a formal term. Let T be a causal
team, possibly having some formal entries. We read T |=f ψ as “ψ is falsifiable
in T ”, but notice that this is not falsifiability in the dual sense; rather, it is a
partial notion of contradictory negation. We propose the following semantical
clauses:
• T |=f X = x if there is s ∈ T− such that ↓ s(X) and s(X) 6= x
• T |=f X 6= x if there is s ∈ T− such that ↓ s(X) and s(X) = x
• T |=f=(X;Y ) if there are s, s′ ∈ T− such that ↓ s(Y ), ↓ s′(Y ), s(X) =
s′(X) and s(Y ) 6= s′(Y ) (notice that the s(X) need not all be proper
values)
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• T |=f ψ ∧ χ if T |=f ψ or T |=f χ
• T |=f ψ ∨ χ if for all subteams T1, T2 of T with T
−
1 ∪ T
−
2 = T
−, we have
T1 |=f ψ or T2 |=f χ.
(Notice that the clause for disjunction involves universal quantification over
teams).
Can we extend these clauses also to selective and counterfactual implication?
Let us consider as an example the team
X → Y
2 1
1 fˆY (1)
It seems unreasonable to assert that this team falsifies the formula Y = 1 ⊃
X = 2, because, as long as we do not know the function fY , we cannot know
whether fˆY (1) is meant to denote 1 or some other number; therefore, we do not
know whether the second assignment is compatible or not with our selection (if
it were, then the formula would be falsified, otherwise it would not be). We now
give a clause that takes into account this kind of problem.
First, let ψ be a classical formula; let V be the set of variables occurring in
ψ; define Tψ∗ := T
ψ ∪ {s ∈ T−| 6↓ s(V ) for some V ∈ V}. Then, for χ downward
closed formula (as we know formulas of CD to be), a somewhat reasonable clause
for selective implication seems to be:
• T |=f ψ ⊃ χ if Tψ∗ |=f χ
This clause is not completely satisfying, because there might be variables in V
that are irrelevant for determining the truth value of ψ.
For counterfactuals, the natural clause is more immediate:
• T |=f X = x✷→ χ if TX=x |=f χ.
Thirdly, notice that, even though we cannot most often decide of the truth
of a statement when columns are incomplete, we might however be interested
in asserting that some proposition is admissible in the given team, that is,
consistent with the data we possess. The following seem to be reasonable clauses
for the atomic formulas:
• T |=a X = x if for all s ∈ T− such that ↓ s(X), s(X) = x
• T |=a X 6= x if for all s ∈ T− such that ↓ s(X), s(X) 6= x
• T |=a= (X;Y ) if for all s, s′ ∈ T− such that ↓ s(Y ) ↓ s′(Y ), s(X) =
s′(X), we have s(Y ) = s′(Y ).
Finding general clauses for composite formulas appears to be a difficult task;
for simplicity, we define this notion only for classical formulas in disjunctive
normal form; we also require, in each conjunctive clause, that atomic formulas
P ij contain distinct variables.
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• T |=a
∨
i=1..m
∧
j=1..n(i) P
i
j (P
i
j being of the form X
i
j = x
i
j or X
i
j 6= x
i
j) if
there are subteams Ti of T , for i = 1..m, such that
1. Ti |=a P ij , for all j.
2. for each j, j′ = 1..n(i), if j 6= j′, P ij is X
i
j = a and P
i
j′ is X
i
j′ = b
(with a 6= b), then for all s ∈ Ti, s(X ij) 6= s(X
i
j′ ).
3. for each j, j′ = 1..n(i), if j 6= j′, P ij is X
i
j = a and P
i
j′ is X
i
j′ 6= a,
then for all s ∈ Ti, s(X ij) 6= s(X
i
j′).
The clauses 2. and 3. above refer to formal inequality between terms. To
have an idea of the intuition behind clause 2., the reader may think, for example,
of the problem of checking the admissibility of X = 1 ∧ Y = 2; imagine that
there is a row in which both the X-column and the Y -columm contain the formal
term f(3, g(2)); then, surely, the formula is not admissible (for X = 1 ∧ Y = 2
to hold in the team, it is necessary that the X and Y -column differ on each
row).
An intuition for clause 3. can be similarly obtained by thinking of checking
the admissibility of X = 1 ∧ Y 6= 1; again, for admissibility, we need the term
f(3, g(2)) not to occur both in the X and Y column.
6 Probabilistic semantics
6.1 A probabilistic language
In Woodward’s approach, probabilistic notions of causality are considered next
to the deterministic ones; for example, a variable X is said to be a total cause
(in the probabilistic sense) of a different variable Y if there is an intervention
do(X = x) which changes the probability of Y = y for some value of y.
In Pearl ([22]), and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines ([26]), one finds a rep-
resentation of causal and counterfactual reasoning in a mixed framework which
combines a deterministic component (functional equations) with a probabilistic
one (probability distributions over exogenous variables). Such structures, which
have been widely studied in the literature, induce causal Bayesian networks, as
shortly mentioned in the introduction.
In the context of team semantics, probabilities have been recently introduced
via the notion of multiteam. A multiteam differs from a team in that it may
feature multiple copies of the same assignment; it is therefore closer to a collec-
tion of experimental data than teams are. There have been at least two different
approaches to the formalization of multiteams in the literature ([33], [7]). How-
ever, the approach we take in the following is that of simulating multiteams by
means of teams; this can be easily accomplished by assuming that each team
has an extra variable Key (which is never mentioned in our formal languages)
which takes distinct values on distinct assignments of the same causal team. In
this way, we can have two assignments that agree on all the significant variables
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and just differ on Key. With this assumption in mind, the definition of causal
multiteam can follow word by word the definition of causal team.
We will now work towards the definition of languages that can be appro-
priate for the discussion and study of probabilistic notions as interpreted over
causal multiteams. If we wish to talk about probabilities, it seems natural to
add appropriate atomic formulas to our formal language. In theory, it would
make sense to assign probabilities to any flat formula of the resulting language.
However, for technical simplicity, we only allow our formal language to talk of
probabilities of CO formulas (which were proved to be flat in earlier sections).
Definition 6.1. The set of probabilistic literals is given by:
¬α|Pr(χ) ≤ ǫ|Pr(χ) ≥ ǫ|Pr(χ) ≤ Pr(θ)|Pr(χ) ≥ Pr(θ)
where α is a probabilistic literal, χ, θ are formulas of CO and ǫ ∈ R ∩ [0, 1].
Literals and probabilistic literals without negation will be called atomic formulas.
The (basic) probabilistic causal language (PCD) is given by the following
clauses:
α|ψ ∧ χ|ψ ∨ χ|ψ ⊔ χ|θ ⊃ ψ|X = x✷→ ψ
where α is a literal or probabilistic literal, ψ, χ are PCD formulas, and θ a
boolean combination of (non probabilistic) atoms.
As in the non-probabilistic case, we also define restricted languages:
• PC if selective implication is not allowed
• PO if counterfactuals are not allowed
• P if neither selective implications nor counterfactuals are allowed.
Some words are needed to motivate our choice of languages and their restric-
tions. First of all, notice that, besides the usual (tensor) disjunction ∨ that most
naturally arises in the context of logics of dependence, we also add to our proba-
bilistic languages what is called in the literature intuitionistic disjunction; that
is, a binary connective ⊔ which satisfies the following semantical clause (already
introduced in an earlier section):
• T |= ψ ⊔ χ ⇐⇒ T |= ψ or T |= χ.
If one wants to express that the disjunctive event “X = x or Y = y” has proba-
bility ǫ, it can be done using the formula Pr(X = x∨Y = y) = ǫ (the semantics
of probabilistic atoms will be defined soon below). If one wishes to make dis-
junctive statements about probabilities, the correct operator is instead the intu-
itionistic disjunction. For example, the statement “either X = x has probability
less than one third, or probability greater than two thirds” will be expressed
as Pr(X = x) < 1/3 ⊔ Pr(X = x) > 2/3. Intuitionistic disjunction turns out
to be particularly useful for defining other operators. For example, dependence
atoms and conditional independence atoms turn out to be (model-theoretically)
definable already in PO (this will be shown later on in the section). This is
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the reason why we have omitted such atoms from the syntax. Furthermore,
we could not come up with any reasonable semantics for selective implications
with probabilistic antecedents, and so we also omitted such constructs from the
syntax.
We will use some obvious abbreviations, such as Pr(χ) = ǫ for Pr(χ) ≤
ǫ ∧ Pr(χ) ≥ ǫ, or Pr(χ) < ǫ for Pr(χ) ≤ ǫ ∧ ¬Pr(χ) ≥ ǫ.
The semantic clauses are the same as for the language CD, enriched with
clauses for the probabilistic atoms. In the following, we will often abuse notation
and write {s} for a causal team whose underlying team contains exactly one
assignment. Given any CO formula12 χ and any team T with finite, nonempty
support T−, we can define the probability of χ in T as:
PrT (χ) :=
card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= χ})
card(T−)
.
For T− = ∅, we conventionally assume PrT (χ) to be undefined; and conse-
quently, expressions like PrT (χ) ≤ ǫ, etc. to be false.
Then the clauses for probabilistic atoms follow quite smoothly:
• T |= Pr(χ) ≤ ǫ iff PrT (χ) ≤ ǫ
• T |= Pr(χ) ≥ ǫ iff PrT (χ) ≥ ǫ
• T |= Pr(χ) ≤ Pr(θ) iff PrT (χ) ≤ PrT (θ)
• T |= Pr(χ) ≥ Pr(θ) iff PrT (χ) ≥ PrT (θ)
It is easy to see that the resulting logic is not downward closed. For example,
a team which is such that less than half of its assignments satisfy χ will satisfy
Pr(χ) ≤ 12 . But the subteam T
χ consisting only of the assignments that satisfy
χ will not satisfy Pr(χ) ≤ 12 . Notice also that the atoms of the form Pr(χ) ≤
Pr(θ) (and Pr(χ) ≥ Pr(θ)) could be eliminated if we allowed quantification
over real values: we could then replace them with ∃ǫ(Pr(χ) ≤ ǫ ∧ Pr(θ) ≥ ǫ).
A crucial question which arises right away is: does our definition really
define a probability distribution on a team T of finite support? Let ET be
the set of all subsets S of T which are definable by a CO formula χ (that is,
S = {s ∈ T−|{s} |= χ}). This will be our set of events. For any event S ∈ ET ,
define PT (S) := PrT (ψ), where ψ is any formula which defines S.
Now, a nice thing about CO formulas is that one can explicitly find (within
CO itself) their complementary negations (a formula is a complementary nega-
tion of ψ if it is satisfied exactly by those singleton causal teams that do not
satisfy ψ). We define a canonical complementary negation ψc for each formula
ψ of CO:
• (X = x)c is X 6= x (for any variable X and value x)
• (X 6= x)c is X = x (for any variable X and value x)
12This definition applies as well to any flat formula.
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• (θ ∧ χ)c is (θc ∨ χc)
• (θ ∨ χ)c is (θc ∧ χc)
• (θ ⊃ χ)c is θ ∧ χc
• (θ ✷→ χ)c is θ ✷→ χc
Complementary negations of CO formulas may fail to be boolean formulas,
but they turn out to be useful because of the following:
Lemma 6.2. Let T be a causal multiteam, ψ ∈ CO, and S = {s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ}.
Then T− \ S = {s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψc}.
Proof. By induction on the synctactical complexity of ψ ∈ CO. We consider the
less obvious cases.
Let ψ = θ ⊃ χ. Then {s} |= ψc iff {s} |= θ∧χc iff (by inductive hypothesis)
{s} |= θ and {s} 6|= χ iff {s} 6|= θ ⊃ χ.
Let ψ = θ ✷→ χ. Then {s} |= ψc iff {s} |= θ✷→ χc iff {s}θ |= χc iff (by
inductive hypothesis) {s}θ 6|= χ iff {s} 6|= θ ✷→ χ.
Theorem 6.3. Let T be a finite causal multiteam. Then (T, ET , PT ) is a prob-
ability space.
Proof. 1) T− is definable by the formula X = x ∨X 6= x. Therefore T− ∈ ET .
2) E is obviously closed under unions (due to finiteness).
3) We want to show that E is closed under complementation. Let S ∈ E .
Then S is defined by some CO formula ψ. But then T− \ S is defined by the
complementary formula ψc, therefore T− \ S ∈ E .
4) PrT (T
−) = 1.
5) Let S1, S2 ∈ ET , with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. S1 and S2 are defined by two CO
formulas ψ1, ψ2, respectively. Then S1 ∪ S2 is defined by ψ1 ∨ ψ2. So
PT (S1 ∪ S2) = PrT (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) =
card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2})
card(T−)
=
=
card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ1}) + card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ2})
card(T−)
=
=
card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ1})
card(T−)
+
card({s ∈ T−|{s} |= ψ2})
card(T−)
=
= PrT (ψ1) + PrT (ψ2) = PT (S1) + PT (S2);
the third equality holds due to the assumption S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
This result allows us to use the usual rules of probability calculus.
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6.2 Comparison with causal models
At this point we are in the position to notice a difference between our approach
and the usual causal models. Recall that in the semi-deterministic approach
of [22] and [26], by a causal model one usually understands (the terminology
is by no means used consistently) a structural equation model enriched with a
probabilistic distribution over the exogenous variables U. If the causal model is
recursive (i.e. the graph is acyclic), then each endogenous variable can be rep-
resented as a function of the exogenous variables (just consider the structural
equation defining an endogenous variable, V := fV (PAV ); iteratively replace
each of the endogenous variables occurring in the right term of this expres-
sion with its structural equation until you obtain a function f ′V (U)). Given
recursivity, the probability distribution over exogenous variables induces a joint
probability distribution over all the variables of the system given by the follow-
ing equation:
P (X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn = xn) := (2)∑
{(u1,...,uk)|for all i=1..n : f ′Xi
(u1,...,uk)=xi}
P (U1 = u1 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk = uk)
From this joint probability, one can obtain by marginalization the distributions
of each set of variables.
This approach fails, however, for non-recursive causal models, in case their
system of structural equations has multiple solutions or no solutions at all for
some configuration(s) of values of the exogenous variables. In this case some
endogenous variables may fail to be functions of the exogenous variables (con-
sider e.g. a system with variables U,X, Y all having range {0, 1}, and consisting
of the equations X := Y and Y := X , which induce the arrows X → Y and
Y → X ; here U is the only exogenous variable; given a fixed value u for U , both
triples (u, 0, 0) and (u, 1, 1) are solutions to the system; therefore, neither X nor
Y can be determined as functions of U).
Unlike the semi-deterministic approach of causal models, our definition of
probabilities for causal teams applies to both recursive and non-recursive sys-
tems. This is due to the fact that we do not conflate in our framework two
different accounts of exogeneity, as it is often the case in the literature. In the
first account, exogenous variables are treated as quantities whose causal mecha-
nisms are not further examined in the model. In the second account, exogenous
variables are treated as unobserved variables. The treatment of exogenous vari-
ables in our causal teams supports the first account: they have no structural
equations, but the assignments of the causal teams encode quantitative informa-
tion about them. To the extent to which causal teams stick to the first account,
they are more general than causal models. (Of course, if we further extend
causal teams to allow for unobserved variables, probabilities in non-recursive
systems might fail again to be determined by the exogenous distribution; such
a generalisation is beyond the scope of the present paper).
We might ask at this point whether our probabilities extend correctly (“con-
servatively”) the probabilities typical of recursive causal models. That is, if
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we take the team-defined probability over the exogenous variables U, and we
define the joint probability by formula (2), do we obtain the team-defined joint
probability? The answer is affirmative:
Theorem 6.4. Let T be a recursive causal multiteam with exogenous variables
U = U1, . . . , Uk. For each (u1, . . . , uk) ∈
∏
i=1..k Ran(Ui), let P (U1 = u1 ∧
· · · ∧Uk = uk) := PrT (U1 = u1 ∧ · · · ∧Uk = uk). Let X1, . . . , Xn be a list of all
variables of T , and P (X1, . . . , Xn) be defined from P (U1 = u1∧· · ·∧Uk = uk) as
in equation (2). Then P (X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) = PrT (X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn =
xn) for any tuple (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
Xi∈dom(T )
Ran(Xi).
Proof. By definition,
PrT (X1 = x1∧· · ·∧Xn = xn) =
card({s ∈ T |s(X1) = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ s(Xn) = xn})
card(T )
.
Clause c) in the definition of causal teams entails that this last term is equal to
card({s ∈ T |f ′Xi(s(U1), . . . , s(Uk)) = xi for i = 1..n})
card(T )
where the f ′Xi(u1, . . . , uk) are defined as above. We can further decompose the
numerator according to the values taken by U1, . . . , Uk, which ultimately leads
to
∑
(u1,...,uk)| for all i,f ′Xi
(u1,...,uk)=xi
card({s ∈ T |s(U1) = u1, . . . , s(Uk)) = uk})
card(T )
that is ∑
(u1,...,uk)| for all i,f ′Xi
(u1,...,uk)=xi
P (U1 = u1 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk = uk)
which is the definition of P (X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn).
6.3 Definability in the probabilistic language
Can we define conditional probabilities in our framework? Semantically, the
obvious definition of a conditional probability over a team is ( assuming that
χ1, χ2 are CO formulas, and χ1 is satisfied by at least one assignment of the
team):
PrT (χ2|χ1) :=
PrT (χ1 ∧ χ2)
PrT (χ1)
.
It is more complicated to assess whether our current formal languages can talk
about conditional probabilities. We can see that, in a number of circumstances,
the selective implication can take the role of conditioning. For example, under
the same assumptions as above, we can write Pr(χ2|χ1) ≤ ǫ as an abbreviation
for
χ1 ⊃ Pr(χ2) ≤ ǫ
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Here is the proof that the abbreviation has the intended meaning:
T |= χ1 ⊃ Pr(χ2) ≤ ǫ ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ T χ1 |= Pr(χ2) ≤ ǫ
⇐⇒
card({s ∈ (T χ1)−|{s} |= χ2})
card((T χ1 )−)
≤ ǫ
⇐⇒
card({s ∈ (T χ1)−|{s} |= χ2})
card(T−)
card(T−)
card((T χ1 )−)
≤ ǫ
⇐⇒
PrT (χ1 ∧ χ2)
PrT (χ1)
≤ ǫ ⇐⇒ PrT (χ2|χ1) ≤ ǫ
provided PrT (χ1) > 0. In case PrT (χ1) = 0, then the causal team is empty,
so that our earlier conventions impose that T χ1 6|= Pr(χ2|χ1) ≤ ǫ. Therefore,
in this case we treat conventionally the expression Pr(χ2|χ1) ≤ ǫ as not be-
ing satisfied by T . Things work analogously for inequalities in the opposite
direction, and one can similarly prove that T |= χ ⊃ Pr(ψ1) ≤ Pr(ψ2) iff
PrT (ψ1|χ) ≤ PrT (ψ2|χ).
We would like, however, to point out that our logical language is in some
respect more general than other languages typically used in the causation lit-
erature (see e.g. [22], chap. 3). To give an example, Pearl would write
P (y|do(x), u) = ǫ, or P (y|xˆ, u) = ǫ, to denote the probability, given the ob-
servation that U is equal to u, of Y being equal to ǫ, in the model where X
has been fixed to x by an intervention (see e.g. [22] sec. 3.4). This is expressed
in our notation by X = x✷→ (U = u ⊃ Pr(Y = y) = ǫ). A straightfor-
ward computation shows that this expression is equivalent to the statement
that PrTX=x(Y = y|U = u) = ǫ, that is, that the probability of Y = y con-
ditional on U = u in the intervened team is ǫ. But in our language we also
have available formulas like U = u ⊃ (X = x✷→ P (Y = y) = ǫ). This for-
mula is not necessarily equivalent to the previous one. This point can be seen
by looking back at an example considered in subsection 4.3 to show the non-
commutativity of selective and counterfactual implications. The team S in that
example satisfies Z = 1✷→ (Y = 3 ⊃ Pr(Y = 3) = 1) but does not satisfy
Y = 3 ⊃ (Z = 1✷→ Pr(Y = 3) = 1). The difference between the two formulas
is that in the second we consider the observational evidence that in the initial
model, U has value u. We can explicitly show that the second formula expresses
the fact that the probability of Y = y, after the intervention do(X = x), is
smaller than ǫ, conditional on the evidence that U = u in the pre-intervention
team.
The equivalence can be proved as follows:
T |= U = u ⊃ (X = x✷→ P (Y = y) = ǫ) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ TU=u |= X = x✷→ P (Y = y) = ǫ
⇐⇒ (TU=u)X=x |= P (Y = y) = ǫ
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⇐⇒
card({s ∈ ((TU=u)X=x)−|{s} |= Y = y})
card(((TU=u)X=x)−)
= ǫ
⇐⇒
card({t ∈ (TU=u)−|{t}X=x |= Y = y})
card((TU=u)−)
= ǫ
⇐⇒
card({t ∈ (TU=u)−|{t}X=x |= Y = y})
card(T−)
·
card(T−)
card((TU=u)−)
= ǫ
⇐⇒
PrT (U = u ∧ (X = x✷→ Y = y))
PrT (U = u)
= ǫ
⇐⇒ PrT (X = x✷→ Y = y|U = u) = ǫ
(the fourth equivalence makes an essential use of the fact that we are using
multiteams, not teams). In Pearl’s notation, there is always the implicit con-
vention that what occurs as a conditioning variable (in this case u) has to be
conditioned on in the post-intervention model. This is also the reason why u
and do(x) can occur in the same position in the notation, without any prob-
lems of non-commutativity arising. But this limitation seems problematic in the
context of causal reasoning. We might want, for example, to discuss the effects
of an intervention over a restricted population, and Pearl’s notation does not
seems to be of any help in this case. The same problem seems to afflict other
notational representations of counterfactuals, such as the one coming from the
potential outcome tradition ([21], [23], [8]). In that notational system we can
write, say, Yx(u) = y to express that, under the observation that U is u, fixing
X to x forces Y to take value y (U = u ⊃ (X = x✷→ Y = y)), but there
seems to be no way to express the formula X = x✷→ (U = u ⊃ Y = y). Since
exogenous variables are not indirectly affected by interventions, this is just a
minor problem; but the limits of the notation immediately arise again if one
discusses conditional interventions that involve some exogenous variable.
Let us now see what kind of (probabilistic) dependencies and independencies
are definable in our framework. First of all, we can give a model-dependent
definition of two CO formulas being probabilistically independent : χ1 |= χ2. To
this purpose, notice that all probabilities expressible over a team T are multiple
of the minimum unit u = 1/card(T−). Thanks to this, probabilistic atoms of
the form Pr(χ2|χ1) ≤ Pr(θ) can be given a model-dependent definition within
PO (under the assumption PrT (χ1) > 0):
T |= Pr(χ2|χ1) ≤ Pr(θ) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ T |=
⊔
m=0..card(T−)
[(χ1 ⊃ Pr(χ2) ≤ mu) ∧ Pr(θ) ≥ mu)]
Assuming by default that, if either χ1 or χ2 has probability 0, then the two
formulas are probabilistically independent, we can take χ1 |= χ2 as an abbrevi-
ation for Pr(χ1) = 0 ⊔ Pr(χ2) = 0 ⊔ Pr(χ2|χ1) = Pr(χ2). More generally, we
can talk of conditional independence atoms χ1 |= χ3χ2 as abbreviations for
Pr(χ1|χ3) = 0 ⊔ Pr(χ2|χ3) = 0 ⊔ Pr(χ2|χ1 ∧ χ3) = Pr(χ2|χ3).
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It would be important to understand whether independence atoms χ1 ⊥χ3 χ2
([10]) are definable or not in this framework, or whether it would be worth to
add them to the language. This would lead to a simple uniform definition of
dependence atoms; but we do not know the answer to this question. However,
we can see that it is possible to give a model-dependent definition (in PO)
of dependence atoms in terms of conditional independence atoms. Given a
sequence (x1, . . . , xn) of values (implicitly associated to variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈
dom(T )), we say that (x1, . . . , xn) occurs in T if there is an s ∈ T such that
s(X1) = x1, . . . , s(Xn) = xn.
Theorem 6.5. For any finite causal multiteam T , T |==(X;Y ) if and only if
T |=
∧
(x,y)∈Ran(X)×Ran(Y )
Y = y |= X=xY = y.
Proof. The conjunction says that, for every tuple x, y of appropriate values for
X, Y , either PrT (Y = y|X = x) = 0, or PrT (Y = y|Y = y ∧ X = x) =
PrT (Y = y|X = x).
That is, for each x, y ∈ Ran(X)×Ran(Y ), either this tuple does not occur
in T or PrT (Y = y|X = x) = 1, which means, more explicitly:
card({s ∈ T−|s(Y ) = y and s(X) = x})
card({s ∈ T−|s(X) = x})
= 1
which is equivalent to
card({s ∈ T−|s(Y ) = y and s(X) = x}) = card({s ∈ T−|s(X) = x})
Given the finiteness of the team, this last equality is equivalent to the state-
ment that any assignment s which satisfies s(X) = x also satisfies s(Y ) = y.
6.4 The Markov Condition
An assumption underlying a vast literature on causal studies is the so-called
Markov Condition. As a condition on a causal team T , it seems natural to
paraphrase it as follows:
PrT (X = x|PAX = paX) = PrT (X = x|PAX = paX ,N = n)
for any set N of nondescendants of X disjoint from PAX
and any tuple (x, paX ,n) occurring in T .
This is a scheme of conditions which state that each variable is independent
of its nondescendants, conditional on its parents. This condition is considered
important in causal inference, for example, because it allows to write the joint
probability of the system in a compact and usually easy to compute form (prod-
uct formula):
PrT (X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn = xn) =
∏
i=1..n
PrT (Xi = xi|PAi = pai)
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where pai is x1, . . . , xn restricted to the values for PAi. This formula, in turn,
gives a modular method for calculating the joint probability in intervened teams:
PrTZ=z(X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn = xn) =
∏
Xi /∈Z
PrT (Xi = xi|PAi = pai).
However, in causal (multi)teams the Markov Condition is not automatically
satisfied. As a simple counterexample, consider the team
X Y
1 1
2 1
1 2
Since the parent set of X is the empty set, and the tuple X = 1, Y = 2 occurs
in the team, the Markov Condition would imply: P (X = 1) = P (X = 1|Y = 2).
However, here we have Pr(X = 1) = 2/3, but P (X = 1|Y = 2) = 1.
The Markov Condition is a rather complex condition to require on a team;
for example, it might be noticed that its verification can require an exponential
time in the number of variables of the domain (since we have to verify such
a condition for every appropriate set Z of variables). It is probably desirable
to find a simpler axiom that implies the Markov Condition. We suggest the
following Markov Axiom Scheme (MA):
PrT (X = x|PAX = paX) = PrT (X = x|PAX = paX ,Y = y)
where Y is the set of all nondescendants of X not occurring in PAX
and for any tuple (x,y) occurring in T .
Notice that in this case we have one axiom for each variable in the domain;
therefore, the complexity of verifying the Markov Axiom Scheme is linear in
the number of variables. We have to prove that this condition is sufficient
to enforce the Markov condition. This is obtained by a merely probabilistic
reasoning, which we are allowed to used thanks to our earlier proof that teams
endowed with our probability function form a σ-algebra. The following lemma
is an immediate consequnce of basic probability calculus:
Lemma 6.6. For any CO formulas ψ, χ, θ and causal multiteam T , and assum-
ing that PrT (χ∧θ) > 0, it follows that PrT (ψ∧χ|θ) = PrT (ψ|χ∧θ) ·PrT (χ|θ).
Theorem 6.7. Suppose that a causal multiteam T satisfies the Markov Axiom
Scheme. Then it satisfies the Markov Condition.
Proof. Let Xi ∈ dom(T ), PAi its set of parents, Z a set of variables such
that PAi ⊆ Z ⊆ dom(T ) \ {Xi}, and such that any element of Z \ PAi is a
nondescendant of Xi. We want to show that PrT (Xi = xi|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) =
PrT (Xi = xi|
∧
Xj∈PAi
Xj = xj) for any tupla (x1, . . . , xn) occurring in T .
Let W = {Xj ∈ dom(T )|Xj nondescendant of Xi and Xj /∈ Z}. In case W
is empty, this means that Z\PAi is the set of all nondescendants of Xi that are
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not in PAi; therefore the equality we are trying to prove is simply an instance
of the Markov Axiom.
Suppose then that W is nonempty. We now write z for the subsequence of
values of the specific sequence (x1, . . . , xn) that correspond to the variables in
Z; and wz for the concatenation of sequence z with some sequence w of values
for W. Define TZ(W) = {w| there is s ∈ T− such that s(W) = w and s(Z) =
z} = {w|PrT (W = w ∧ Z = z) > 0}. Notice then that, if PrT (W = w ∧ Z =
z) = 0, it follows that PrT (Xi = xi ∧W = w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) = 0. Therefore
we can write:
PrT (Xi = xi|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) =
=
∑
w∈TZ(W)
PrT (Xi = xi ∧W = w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj)
because the events Xi = xi ∧W = w, as w varies among tuples occurring in
TZ(W), are disjoint; and for other values w /∈ TZ(W), PrT (Xi = xi ∧W =
w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) = 0.
Since, furthermore, for any w ∈ TZ(W) it holds that PrT (W = w ∧∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) > 0, we are entitled to use Lemma 6.6 on each summand,
which yields the expression∑
w∈TZ(W)
[PrT (Xi = xi|W = w,
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj) · PrT (W = w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj)].
Now, applying the appropriate instances of the Markov Axiom, one obtains∑
w∈TZ(W)
[PrT (Xi = xi|
∧
Xj∈PAi
Xj = xj) · PrT (W = w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj)].
Since the left factor does not depend anymore on w, we can extract it:
PrT (Xi = xi|
∧
Xj∈PAi
Xj = xj) ·
∑
w∈TZ(W)
PrT (W = w|
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj).
Since the events form a σ-algebra, and TZ(W) contains all the values w such
that W = w ∧
∧
Xj∈Z
Xj = xj has positive probability, the right factor sums
up to 1, and we obtain the desired equality.
6.5 Pearl’s example in causal teams
We conclude this section illustrating the workings of the probabilistic semantics
for causal teams over an example taken from Pearl ([22], 1.4.4).
For Pearl the purpose of the example is to show that causal Bayesian net-
works are insufficient to answer counterfactual questions, which require struc-
tural equations. Our concern here would only be with that aspect of the example
(Pearl’s “model 2”) which illustrates the three stages in his treatment of coun-
terfactuals in the structural equation framework. The following quote gives the
spirit of the enterprise:
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The preceding considerations further imply that the three tasks
listed in the beginning of this section - prediction, intervention, and
counterfactuals - form a natural hierarchy of causal reasoning tasks,
with increasing levels of refinement and increasing demands on the
knowledge required for accomplishing the tasks. Prediction is the
simplest of the three, requiring only a specification of a joint dis-
tribution function. The analysis of interventions requires a causal
structure in addition to a joint distribution. Finally, processing
counterfactuals is the hardest task because it requires some infor-
mation about the functional relationships and/or the distribution of
the omitted factors. (p. 38)
The example is about a clinical test. There are two exogenous variables X
(being treated: X = 1; not being treated: X = 0) and Y (which measures the
subject’s response: recovery Y = 0, death, Y = 1). There are two exogenous
(hidden), independent variables U1 and U2. The equations of the model are:
{
x = u1
y = xu2 + (1 − x)(1 − u2)
They induce the following DAG:
X
Y
U1
U2
The two independent binary variables are governed by the probability dis-
tribution P (u1 = 1) = P (u2 = 1) =
1
2 , which generates joint probability distri-
butions P (x, y, u2) and P (x, y) that may be calculated using the formula from
subsection 6.2. For instance, P (X = x ∧ Y = y) =
=
∑
{(u1,u2)|u1=x∧u1u2+(1−u1)(1−u2)=y}
P (U1 = u1 ∧ U2 = u2) = 0, 25
for all x and y. Here is a table which lists P (x, y, u2) and P (x, y) :
u2 = 1 u2 = 0 Marginal
x = 1 x = 0 x = 1 x = 0 x = 1 x = 0
y = 1 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25
y = 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25
Pearl considers the following counterfactual query:
(*) What is the probability Q that a subject who died under treatment (x =
1, y = 1) would have recovered (y = 0) had he or she not been treated
(x = 0)?
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He calls the fact that the subject died under treatment the evidence
e = {(x = 1, y = 1)}
and points out that answering the above query involves three steps: (1) given
the evidence e, (3) we compute the probability Y = y (2) under the hypothetical
condition X = x.
In his example this amounts to:
1. We apply the evidence e to the set of equations, and conclude that it is
compatible with only one realization: u1 = 1 and u2 = 1. This gives us a
value for u2.
2. We make an intervention do(X = 0) on the variable X . It results in the
first equation being replaced with x = 0.
3. We solve the second equation for x = 0, u2 = 1. We get y = 0 from which
we conclude that the probability Q is 1.
We are told that in the general case
• step (1) corresponds to an abduction: update the probability P (u) to
obtain P (u|e)
• step (2) corresponds to an action: replace the equations corresponding to
each intervened variable X by X = x
• step (3) corresponds to a prediction: compute P (y) in the new model.
(Pearl 2009, p.61)
Pearl is explicit on the point that if for each value u of the exogenous vari-
ables U there is a unique solution for Y , then step (3) always gives a unique
solution for the needed probability: we simply sum up the probabilities P (u|e)
assigned to all u which yield Y = y as a solution. More technically:
P (y) =
∑
{u:f ′Y (u)=y}
P (u|e)
Pearl’s model 2 can be represented in our framework by using the causal
team T
U1 U2 X Y
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
where the range of each variable is {0, 1} and the arrows of the DAG are
induced by the two structural equations given earlier, which are part of the
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description of the team. Notice also that this team, interpreted as a multiteam,
bears the same probabilities that are carried by the system described by Pearl.
It can be checked that T is an explicit causal team. We formulate Pearl’s
query in our language as
X = 1 ∧ Y = 1 ⊃ (X = 0✷→ Y = 0) (3)
or, in its probabilistic version, as
X = 1 ∧ Y = 1 ⊃ (X = 0✷→ Pr(Y = 0) = 1). (4)
By the clause for selective implication, the formula (3) is true in the causal
team T if and only if the formula (X = 0✷→ Y = 0) is true in the causal team
represented by the annotated table
U1 U2 X Y
1 1 1 1
and the two structural equations. Now the formula (X = 0✷→ Y = 0) is
true, given that the intervention do(X = 0) generates the causal team repre-
sented by the annotated team
U1 U2 X Y
1 1 0 0
and the same system of equations, except for the first one, replaced by X = 013.
Obviously Y = 0 is true in this causal team, which shows that the formula (4)
is true.
Later on in section 7, where we will introduce various notions of cause within
causal team semantics, we will see that in this example it is also true that X is
a direct cause of Y in T .
Now recall our observations from subsection 6.3 concerning the definability
of conditional probabilistic formulas. Those results show that
X = 1 ∧ Y = 1 ⊃ (X = 0✷→ Pr(Y = 0) = 1)
is true in a causal team T if and only if
PrT (X = 0✷→ Y = 0 | X = 1 ∧ Y = 1) = 1.
We notice that the formula inside the brackets shows nicely Pearl’s three “mental
steps”.
13Actually, in the causal team formalism this is represented by the removal of the invariant
function F
TX=1∧Y =1
(X), and the change of role of X, from endogenous to exogenous variable.
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7 Causal modeling
7.1 Direct and total cause
What might be interesting to express in our languages? We consider the two
basic type-causal notions from Woodward ([38]), direct and total cause.
Let us consider the case of direct cause. Recall Woodward’s definition of
a direct cause in section 2.3:
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of
Y with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible
intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution
of Z) when all other variables in V besides X and Z are held fixed
at some value by interventions.
Woodward’s definition is slightly ambiguous in that it talks about a change in
Y , but does not say with respect to what the change is made; to Y ’s actual value?
To some possible value of Y , i.e., some y ∈ Ran(Y )? To a y occurring in some
allowed configuration (assignment)? We resolve the ambiguity by stipulating
that the values of Y to compared be generated by two distinct interventions.
The kind of intervention needed for the evaluation of direct causation of X
on Y is a simultaneous intervention on all variables in the system except for X
and Y . As an example, let T be the team
X Z Y
1 1 2
2 2 4
3 3 6
with FZ(x) := x and FY (x, z) = x + z. It is an essential ingredient of this
example that there is an arrow from X to Y . We show that X is a direct cause
of Y in T . First of all we must fix all other variables (in this case, just Z) to an
appropriate value (we choose 1) by an intervention, which also updates Y :
X Z Y
1 1 2
2 1 3
3 1 4
Then we intervene in two different ways on X :
X Z Y
1 1 2
X Z Y
2 1 3
The fact that the two interventions select distinct values for Y proves that X is
a direct cause of Y .
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The peculiar form of these kinds of interventions makes so that, if there is
an arrow from X to Y , after the intervention all the columns in the team are
constant, that is, a singleton team is produced. This suggests that direct cause
can also be defined as an operation on teams, instead of as an operation on
assignments. Let Fix(z) be an abbreviation for
∧
Z∈Dom(T )\{X,Y } Z = z:
T |= DC(X ;Y ) iff there are z, x 6= x′, y 6= y′ such that
T |= (Fix(z) ∧X = x)✷→ Y = y
and T |= (Fix(z) ∧X = x′)✷→ Y = y′.
This semantical definition suggests that direct causation might be definable in
an appropriate quantifier extension of CD. We do not venture into this direc-
tion, but we look instead for a model-dependent definition in the language CD
enriched with intuitionistic disjunction ⊔14 15. With the help of this operator,
we can express the fact that X is a direct cause of Y in the causal team T ,
T |= DC(X ;Y ), by the formula
⊔
x 6=x′,y 6=y′,z
[(Fix(z) ∧X = x)✷→ Y = y] ∧ [(Fix(z) ∧X = x′)✷→ Y = y′]
where the disjunction ranges over all tuples (x, x′, y, y′, z) ∈ Ran(X)2×Ran(Y )2×
Ran(Z) such that x 6= x′ and y 6= y′. This definition is model-dependent in that
it makes reference to the ranges of varianbles, and to a set Z = dom(T )\{X,Y }
of variables that is determined by the domain of the causal team.
If there is an arrow from X to Y , any intervention of this kind will collapse
the team to a singleton team, so that the condition for direct cause can be
checked (it can fail; see the example below). But if instead some intervention of
this form does not collapse the team into a singleton team, then necessarily there
is no arrow from X to Y . Therefore, the graph of direct causes is a subgraph
of the graph of the team. It can be a proper subgraph, that is, there might be
an arrow between two variables X and Y , and yet those fail to be in the direct
cause relationship; this is what happens in the following causal team (with, say,
Ran(X) = Ran(Y ) = {0, 1}):
X→Y
0 0
1 0
The definition of probabilistic direct cause in PCD presents a little surprise.
As in the deterministic case, we use counterfactual antecedents of the form
X = x ∧ Fix(z) to try to reduce to one the number of configurations occurring
14The results of [40] entail that, in the case of propositional dependence logic, the intuition-
istic disjunction is eliminable in terms of the other propositional connectives (although not
uniformly definable, [39]). It is unclear, at the current state of investigation, whether these
results translate into our framework.
15A remark: adding to C or CO the intuitionistic disjunction, one obtains logics that are
still downward closed, but not flat.
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in the multiteam; however, now, even in presence of an arrow from X to Y , the
resulting team is not necessarily a singleton team, but it will be in general a
collection of identical copies of one and the same assignment; the formula Y = y
will assume probability 0 or 1. This leads to simplifications in the definition of
probabilistic direct cause. Write Ψx,x′;y;z for
((Fix(z)∧X = x)✷→ Pr(Y = y) = 0∧ ((Fix(z)∧X = x′)✷→ Pr(Y = y) = 1.
Then, probabilistic direct cause can be formulated as:
T |= PDC(X ;Y ) iff there are z, x, x′, y such that T |= Ψx,x′;y;z
A non-uniform definition in PCD is as follows:⊔
x 6=x′,y,z
Ψx,x′;y;z
We may conclude that the probabilistic notion of direct cause collapses to the
deterministic one.
The case of total cause ([38]) is more complicated. Recall Woodward’s
definition from section 2.3:
X is a total cause of Y if and only if there is a possible intervention
on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y .
This formulation of Woodward is again very ambiguous in some respects; as
before, we can think this “change” in terms of two interventions; but, are the
“changes” mentioned relative to some fixed actual configuration of the system
(i.e. assignment), or should one check all possible configurations? We opt here
for the second interpretation. This gives us a reasonable condition for obtaining
again the collapse of the team to a singleton. The idea to obtain this is to fix
(to some value) all the variables that are not descendants of X . Let us call this
set NDX ; we use letter w to indicate values for these variables. Write Fix
′(w)
for
∧
W∈NDX
W = w, and Ξx,x′;y,y′;w for
Fix′(w)✷→ [(X = x✷→ Y = y) ∧ (X = x′ ✷→ Y = y′)].
We can then define total cause as:
T |= TC(X ;Y ) iff there are x 6= x′,w ∈ T (NDX), y 6= y
′
such that T |= Ξx,x′;y,y′;w.
This, once more, can be witten a a single formula:
T |=
⊔
x 6=x′,w∈T (NDX),y 6=y′
Ξx,x′;y,y′;w.
Things work differently in the probabilistic framework. Notice that in the
language PCD we have (abbreviated) formulas of the form
X = x✷→ Pr(Y = y) = ǫ
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saying that an intervention fixing the value of X at x will affect in a certain
way the probability distribution of Y . If a conjunction of the following form
Θx,x′;y;ǫ,ǫ′ : (X = x✷→ Pr(Y = y) = ǫ) ∧ (X = x
′
✷→ Pr(Y = y) = ǫ′)
holds for two distinct values ǫ, ǫ′, we can conclude that X is a total cause in
the (probabilistic) sense given by Woodward. More precisely, we can treat
probabilistic total causation as follows. X is a (probabilistic) total cause of
Y , T |= PTC(X ;Y ), iff
there are x 6= x′, y, ǫ 6= ǫ′ such that T |= Θx,x′;y;ǫ,ǫ′.
Compare this with the definition of deterministic total cause; the clauses have
been considerably simplified. This follows from the fact that, differently from
deterministic atoms of the form Y = y, the probabilistic atoms Pr(Y = y) = ǫ
are not flat; they instead express a global property of the team. Therefore,
there is no need to use the trick that was applied in the deterministic case
(fixing counterfactually the nondescendants of X , so that the team collapses to
a single assignment). In this probabilistic context, total causation is genuinely
a property of teams, not of single assignments.
Observing that the probability of any formula in the language is an integer
multiple of the smallest unit u = 1card(T−) , and that probabilities range within
[0, 1]∩R, we can also explictly define (in a non-uniform way) T |= PTC(X ;Y )
as: ⊔
x 6=x′,y,m 6=n,m,n=0..card(T−)
Θx,x′;y;mu,nu.
7.2 Higher-order effects
In general, a variable X might be thought to have some kind of “causal effect”
on another variable Y if intervening in some way on X can change the state of
variable Y . In the kind of language that is usually applied to describe a causal
model, the “state” of a variable Y is completely summarized by a formula of
the form Y = y, asserting that Y is taking a specific value y. But, in a team,
it may happen that a variable Y satisfies none of such formulas. Yet there are
properties that can be ascribed or not to a variable Y in T , and that might
cease or begin to hold after an intervention on X . One example are statements
on the probability distribution of Y . Or, there might be some deterministic
property, say ψ(Y ), which does not hold in T , but holds after an intervention
that reduces the range of Y -values occurring in the team. This suggests that
“X is a total cause of Y ” might be redefined, in contexts more general than
the usual causal modeling, as the statement that “there is an intervention on X
that changes some property of Y ”; and similarly for other notions of causation.
Therefore, the arguments above rather show that the notion of direct cause is
special, in that its evaluation over a team can be reduced to evaluation over
causal models.
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Our formalism allows many more counterfactuals than those that are typi-
cally used in the definition of causal notions; it allows us to ponder, for example,
what effects an intervention has on a set of variables. Let us consider an exam-
ple which is natural in the team context, but is unlikely to emerge in the usual
discussions on interventionist causality. Consider a causal team T of the form
X Y Z
1 2 1
2 3 1
Clearly T 6|==(Z;Y ). However, the intervened team TX=1
X Y Z
1 2 1
is such that TX=1 |==(Z;Y ). Said otherwise, T |= X = 1✷→=(Z;Y ). So, in-
tervening on X has changed a property of variable Y (that of being functionally
dependent, or not, on Z). Clearly, such a team property is completely different
from those that are usually considered in discussions about causation; and they
may be thought as properties of the set of variables {Y, Z}. Said otherwise,
intervening on X may affect the set {Y, Z}.
We can construct similar examples also in the language of probabilities, with-
out need for counterfactuals nor selective implications. Consider the following
multiteam with variables X,Y and no arrows, and the multiteam obtained from
it by applying do(X = 0):
S:
X Y
0 0
0 1
1 2
SX=0:
X Y
0 0
0 1
0 2
Notice that the intervened team contains a new assignment {(X, 0), (Y, 2)}.
Therefore, the probability of formula X = 0 ∧ Y = 2 raised from 0 (before the
intervention) to 1/3 (after the intervention). In this case, intervening on X af-
fected the set {X,Y }, in the sense that it changed a property of the relationship
between X and Y .
7.3 Invariance
We want to make some remarks about one methodological aspect of Pearl’s
approach to causation. In his causal models, arrows represent the statement,
or guess, that some functional dependencies are invariant under most of the
interventions that can be carried out on the system (a structural equation X :=
fX(PAX) is invariant under all interventions that do not act on X). Graphs
therefore draw a line between some of the dependencies occurring in the data,
which might be considered either 1) contingent or 2) due to a third common
cause, and those that 3) have to be considered causal dependencies. But it must
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be immediately observed that there may be dependencies that are invariant in
the sense specified above, and yet are not represented by arrows in the causal
graph.
Similarly, in our causal teams, the graph G(T ) encodes a set of invariant
functional dependencies of the form =(PAY ;Y ), but the causal team could still
sustain invariant dependencies which are not explicitated by G(T ) (in this case,
we say that a functional dependency =(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ) is invariant in T if it
holds after any intervention on T 16); call Ginv(T ) the graph which represents
all the invariant dependencies. Notice that while the structural equation for Y
is not invariant under interventions that act on Y , the functional dependency
=(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ) is invariant under such interventions, although its arrows are
removed from the graph. What happens is this (we consider for simplicity an
intervention over only one variable Y ): if T |==(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ), then (Xi, Y ) ∈
G(T ) but (Xi, Y ) /∈ G(TY=y). But since Y is constant in TY=y, no further
intervention can disrupt the dependency =(X1, . . . , Xn;Y ); therefore (Xi, Y ) ∈
Ginv(TY=y). This shows that there may be invariant dependencies in a causal
team that are not represented by arrows of the graph.
In general, we can isolate three graphs of interest: G(T ) ⊆ Ginv(T ) ⊆
Gcont(T ), where Gcont(T ) represents all the functional dependencies in T
−, in-
cluding those that are not invariant. (Furthermore, as shown in a previous
subsection, it might be of interest to consider the subgraphs of G(T ) that repre-
sent direct causes, total causes and probabilistic total causes). The point is that
the choice of G(T ) determines what an intervention is/does; in turn, the set of
interventions thus defined may determine some further invariant dependencies
(set Ginv(T )), those that hold both in the initial team and in all the intervened
ones. The arrows of this new graph might happen to be inappropriate to capture
a notion of “direct” or also of “indirect” causation.
It might be interesting to ask whether this kind of invariance is definable in
our languages; the question makes sense not only for functional dependencies,
but for any property definable by a formula. The answer is positive; we can give
a model-dependent definition. A formula ψ is invariant for T if:
T |= INV (ψ) :=
∧
{Z = z✷→ ψ}
where the conjunction ranges over all consistent conjunctions of the form Z = z.
Notice that this is not a single formula, but a scheme of formulas of CD; which
formula is actually picked depends on the domain of the causal team T and
the ranges of its variables. We do not know whether a uniform definition can
be given, or if instead adding invariance statements (for sentences, or just for
dependencies) might increase the expressivity of our languages.
16One might raise the protest that it should be required that =(X1, . . . ,Xn;Y ) be invariant
under any sequence of interventions. However, the importation law we have proved in earlier
sections shows that for any sequence of interventions, there is a single intervention generating
the same modified causal team. Notice, futhermore, that in this context the actual team T
can be thought of as the result of a null intervention.
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8 Conclusions
We have shown how to generalize team semantics in a way that it may incorpo-
rate the kind of counterfactual and causal reasoning which is typical of recursive,
possibly nonparametric structural equation models. We briefly explained how
the semantics can be extended to cover also nonrecursive, parametric mod-
els with unique or no solutions. We introduced languages for causal discourse
(both deterministic and probabilistic) over causal teams; we showed that these
languages are in some ways more general than notations typically used in the
literature (in that, for example, they may distinguish pre- and post-intervention
observations).
We explored somewhat systematically the logic underlying deterministic and
probabilistic languages for interventionist counterfactual reasoning when these
are applied to recursive, parametric causal teams; we also shortly sketched what
challenges arise in the treatment of the nonparametric case, and proposed tenta-
tive clauses for nonclassical semantical notions that naturally arise in this case.
Finally, we analyzed how some of the notions of cause and invariance that arise
from manipulationist theories of causation can be expressed and generalized in
our framework.
These initial explorations of causal team semantics leave space for further
investigation. On the side of causal modeling, parametric nonrecursive and non-
parametric causal teams certainly deserve a more extensive study than what was
sketched here (we find it unlikely, instead, that the study of the nonrecursive
nonparametric teams might be fruitful). Another important case in causal mod-
eling, which we only briefly grazed in this paper, are models with unobserved
variables; defining a causal team semantics for this case would surely require
some deep rethinking of the framework. Similar challenges might be posed by
the study of forms of interventions beyond the “surgical” ones considered here.
On the logical side, it would be important to develop tools for the compari-
son of expressive power of distinct languages, and to investigate systematically
whether the introduction of counterfactuals leads to significant new definability
results. The inferential aspects of causal languages should also be further inves-
tigated; in particular, complete deduction systems for deterministic languages
with (in)dependence atoms are missing; and the case of probabilistic languages
is still unexplored. Further directions for investigation are comparisons with pre-
vious notion of counterfactuals, and the study of the modal structure induced
by interventions on teams.
The present work has been developed within the Academy of Finland Project
n.286991, “Dependence and Independence in Logic: Foundations and Philosoph-
ical Significance”.
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